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Abstract 
 
Kids Will Be Kids: 
Raising the Age of Criminal Responsibility in Texas 
 
Rachel Phillips Gandy, MPAff, MSSW 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 
 
Supervisor:  David Springer 
 
The federal government draws the boundary between childhood and adulthood at 
age 18 for activities such as casting a ballot, joining the military, buying a cigarette, and 
serving time in adult prisons. Texas, however, defies this guideline in one significant 
respect. Here, the age of criminal responsibility is 17 years old. Thus, Texas lawmakers 
consider 17-year-olds mature enough to serve time in adult prisons but too immature to sit 
on the juries that send them there. The departure of Texas statute from federal policies 
ignores the science of brain development and contradicts cost-benefit analyses. Most 
importantly, the Texas law jeopardizes the lives of vulnerable youth and fails to improve 
public safety within local communities. 
Though the vast majority of arrested 17-year-olds commit minor crimes, the 
consequences of an adult conviction are far from minor. This report examines the impacts 
of treating 17-year-olds as adults in the criminal justice system. Impacts include higher 
risks of physical and sexual victimization, psychological trauma, developmental delays, 
 vii 
and long-run economic losses. Together, these effects reach far beyond a teenager’s stay 
in prison to inflict damage across families, communities, and generations of Texans. 
Fortunately, there is a better way to manage 17-year-olds who are highly 
susceptible to the negative impacts of incarceration. In recent years, several states raised 
their ages of criminal responsibility to divert teens away from the dangers of adult 
correctional facilities. These states then experienced three levels of benefits: 
1. Micro-level improvements to each teenager’s neurological and psychosoc ial 
development; 
2. Mezzo-level public safety advantages; and 
3. Macro-level increases to state and county coffers. 
This report analyzes the benefits that teens, communities, and budgets could accrue 
by aligning Texas’ age of criminal responsibility with federal standards. Finally, the report 
outlines practical recommendations for raising the age of criminal responsibility in Texas. 
Only then will vulnerable 17-year-olds receive the protection and opportunities that they 
require to become productive community residents. 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
In 1995, Rodney Hulin, Jr. entered the Clemens Unit, an adult prison facility in 
Brazoria County, Texas. He was sentenced to serve eight years in the facility for arson after 
he set a dumpster on fire in his hometown. The crime caused less than $500 in property 
damage,1 but it set off a series of traumatic events from which Rodney and his family would 
never recover. 
Three days after his arrival at Clemens, Hulin was raped by a fellow prison inmate. 2 
Though a medical exam confirmed the assault, correctional officials refused to transfer 
Hulin to protective housing. Standing at 5’2’’ and weighing only 125 pounds, Hulin 
became easy prey in the adult prison. For months, he was repeatedly raped, beaten, 
extorted, and threatened. After each incident, Hulin begged correctional officers for help. 
In one note to prison officials, he wrote, “I am afraid to go to sleep, to shower, or just about 
anything else. I am afraid that when I am doing these things, I might die at any time. Please, 
sir, help me.”3 Clemens staff denied Hulin’s pleas, stating that his case did not meet the 
“emergency criteria” required for a transfer to protective custody.4 Prison officials instead 
gave Hulin one piece of simple advice: “grow up.”5 
Hulin then took matters into his own hands. He began acting out in order to obtain 
placement in disciplinary segregation where at least he would be separated from his 
                                                 
1 A. Wood, “Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Confining Juveniles with Adults After Graham and Miller,” 
Emory Law Journal 61 (2012): 1447, 
http://law.emory.edu/elj/_documents/volumes/61/6/comments/wood.pdf. 
 2M. Chammah, “Rape in the American Prison,” The Atlantic, February 25, 2015, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/rape-in-the-american-prison/385550/ .  
3 National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, National Prison Rape Elimination Commission Report  
(June 2009): 69, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf. 
4 Ibid, 69. 
5 Ibid, 69. 
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abusers. Once he was taken to solitary confinement, Hulin wrote a letter exclaiming that 
he was “tired of living.”6 On January 26, 1996, only 75 days after his arrival at Clemens, 
he tore up his bed sheet, tied one end to the locker above his cell door, and tied the other 
end around his own neck.7 Then, he jumped. Hulin spent the next four months in a coma, 
during which he was granted parole. On May 9, 1996, he died. 
Rodney Hulin, Jr. was 17 years old. 
THE PROBLEM WITH TEXAS’ AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
If Texas’ age of criminal responsibility mirrored policies found across the country, 
Hulin’s fate could have been remarkably different. The federal government draws the 
boundary between childhood and adulthood at age 18 for activities such as casting a ballot, 
joining the military, buying a cigarette, and serving time in adult prisons. Texas, however, 
defies this guideline in one significant respect. Here, the age of criminal responsibility (i.e., 
the age at which an individual is automatically treated as an adult after committing a crime) 
is 17 years old. In Texas, lawmakers consider 17-year-olds like Rodney Hulin, Jr. mature 
enough to be incarcerated in adult prisons but too immature to sit on the juries that send 
them there.8 The departure of Texas statute from federal policies contradicts both scientific 
research and cost-benefit analyses. Most importantly, the Texas law fails to protect child 
welfare, improve public safety, and advance evidence-based policy practices. 
                                                 
6 J. Mariner, “No Escape: Male Rape in U.S. Prisons,” Human Rights Watch, accessed January 11, 2016, 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report.html. 
7 M. Berryhill, “What Really Happened to Rodney Hulin,” The Houston Press, August 7, 1997, 
http://www.houstonpress.com/news/what-really-happened-to-rodeny-hulin-6570750.  
8 M. Deitch, R. Breeden, and R. Weingarten, “Seventeen, Going on Eighteen: An Operational and Fiscal 
Analysis of a Proposal to Raise the Age of Juvenile Jurisdiction in Texas,” American Journal of Criminal 
Law 40, no. 1 (2012): 4, http://ajclonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/40-1-Deitch.pdf. 
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THE ADULT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
The age of criminal responsibility marks a clear statutory division between the 
juvenile and adult justice systems. Over time, that line has gradually changed, allowing 
more youth to stay in the juvenile justice system and out of adult prisons. In the 1700s, 
children as young as seven years old could be convicted as adults.9 In the 1800s, however, 
reformers created a movement to separate more youth from the adult justice system. 
Reformers established special facilities for delinquent children and provided rehabilita t ive 
programs to change each child’s life course.10 In 1899, reformers in Illinois also developed 
the first juvenile court, and within 25 years, most states followed suit.11 Over the next 
century, child welfare advocates altered informal practices in juvenile courts to mirror the 
policies and rights guaranteed in adult courts, such as the right to an attorney. More than 
100 years later, one founding tenet of the juvenile justice system still remains unchanged : 
juveniles are different from adults and thus should be treated differently when they commit 
crimes. 
Today, the juvenile and adult justice systems continue to employ divergent 
structures and philosophies. The adult system is a criminal system in which court and 
prison officials tend to prioritize punishment. Adorning the walls of many Texas prisons is 
the adult system’s core motto: “our security is not for your convenience.” In contrast, the 
juvenile system is a civil system that prioritizes rehabilitation. As a result, justice-invo lved 
youth receive treatment and programming designed to reorient personal values, encourage 
prosocial behaviors, and reduce recidivism rates. 
                                                 
9 American Bar Association, Dialogue on Youth and Justice (2007): 4, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJfull.authcheckdam.pdf.  
10 Ibid, 5. 
11 Ibid, 5. 
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The structural and philosophical differences between the adult and juvenile justice 
systems point to a key truth: the age at which a person commits a crime is instrumental in 
determining his or her experience within the justice system. In Texas, most adjudicated 
teens who commit crimes on the day before their 17th birthday benefit from rehabilita t ive 
supports and age-appropriate programming. However, if teens commit identical crimes on 
the day they turn 17, they must face the punitive adult system in which the traumas of 
prison can follow individuals for a lifetime. 
Since the 19th century, all states have established juvenile justice systems with 
similar rehabilitative tenets and structures. Despite these similarities, the age line that 
separates the juvenile system from the adult system varies across the nation. The federal 
government and 43 individual states set the age of criminal responsibility at 18 years old.12 
In 2015, Connecticut Governor Dannel Malloy even began a movement to raise the age 
policy in his state up to 20 years old in order to divert more teens away from adult crimina l 
consequences.13 Scattered across the country, seven states adhere to harsher age policies 
that allow younger teens to face adult criminal charges by default.14 Five of these states, 
including Texas, set the age of criminal responsibility at 17 years old. The remaining two 
states (North Carolina and New York) set the age even lower at 16 years old. Figure 1 
below illustrates the policies dictating the age of criminal responsibility across the United 
States. 
 
                                                 
12 E.R. Moravec, “Raising Age to 18 for Adult Criminal Trials May Be a Nonstarter in Texas,” The Dallas 
Morning News, March 1, 2015, http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/state-politics/20150301-raising-
age-to-18-for-adult-criminal-trials-may-be-a-nonstarter-in-texas.ece.  
13 S. Barr, “Connecticut Governor Suggests Raising the Age to 20,” The Juvenile Justice Information 
Exchange, November 6, 2015, http://jjie.org/connecticut-governor-suggests-raising-the-age-to-20/150489/.  
14 As of July 2016, the age of criminal responsibility was below the age of 18 in seven states. Weeks before 
this report was published, two states (Louisiana and South Carolina) passed legislation to raise the age of 
criminal responsibility to 18, while several other states (such as Missouri and Michigan) filed legislation to 
make a similar change.  
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Figure 1. Ages of Criminal Responsibility Across the United States 
 
Creating using data from: National Conference of State Legislators, Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer 
to Adult Court Laws, accessed April 2016, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/juvenile-age-of-jurisdiction-and-transfer-to-adult-court-laws.aspx.  
 
The age of criminal responsibility marks the formal divide between the juvenile 
and adult justice systems. There is a mechanism, however, that bridges that divide by 
allowing justice officials to bypass the age of criminal responsibility in order to try youth 
as adults. Despite their young age, youth convicted of felonies may be transferred to the 
adult criminal justice system through a process called “certification.” In Texas, teenagers 
as young as 14 years old may be convicted for felonies as adults and sentenced to serve 
time in adult prisons.15 In theory, certification is reserved for the most dangerous and 
                                                 
15 The Attorney General of Texas, Juvenile Justice Handbook (2014): 25, 
https://texasattorneygeneral.gov/files/cj/juvenile_justice.pdf.  
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incorrigible youth. In reality, the most important factor in determining a teenager’s 
assignment to the juvenile or adult justice system is his or her county of conviction.16 
THE PROFESSIONAL REPORT 
In this professional report, I will examine the consequences of Texas’ aberrant age 
policy on individual 17-year-olds, their communities, and the state as a whole. In Chapter 
2, I will introduce the demographics and mental health needs of the 17-year-olds who 
commit crimes in Texas. The chapter also presents arrest data to uncover the types of 
criminal activities that bring teens into contact with the justice system in the first place. 
According to the Texas Department of Public Safety, the vast majority of crimes committed 
by 17-year-olds are minor, nonviolent offenses, such as larceny theft, marijuana 
possession, and drunkenness.17 
In Chapter 3, I will review existing literature to determine the current and long- term 
impacts of treating 17-year-olds as adults in the criminal justice system. The chapter 
focuses on four main categories of impacts: 
 Physical impacts, such as physical violence and sexual victimization; 
 Psychological impacts, particularly those that result from the disproportionate 
placement of 17-year-olds in solitary confinement; 
 Developmental impacts, including incarcerated 17-year-olds’ unmet treatment, 
educational, and socialization needs; and 
 Economic impacts, such as reduced earnings achieved by individuals with an adult 
criminal record. 
 
                                                 
16 M. Deitch, Juveniles in the Adult Criminal Justice System in Texas (2011): 13, 
https://www.utexas.edu/lbj/sites/default/files/file/news/juvenilestexas --final.pdf.  
17 Texas Department of Public Safety, 2014 Crime in Texas (2015): 76, 
http://dps.texas.gov/crimereports/14/citCh9.pdf. 
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I have also included an evaluation of the chapter’s evidence to highlight gaps in 
current data and to recommend avenues for future research. 
After reviewing the consequences of treating 17-year-olds as adults in the crimina l 
justice system, Chapter 4 will describe the benefits that could be achieved if Texas 
legislators raise the state’s age of criminal responsibility to at least 18 years old. Benefits 
exist at three levels of a 17-year-old’s ecological system. Benefits include:  
 Micro-level benefits: Individual teens could experience improved neurologica l 
and psychosocial development if they are served in the juvenile justice system. 
 Mezzo-level benefits: Local communities could achieve better public safety 
outcomes if 17-year-olds obtain rehabilitative treatment in the juvenile system. 
 Macro-level benefits: Texas as a whole could accrue net economic benefits if 
county and state governments place 17-year-olds in juvenile facilities and avoid 
violations of the Prison Rape Elimination Act. 
I have also included an evaluation of the chapter’s evidence to discuss the 
challenges of accurately predicting the monetary value of the three levels of benefits 
outlined above. 
Finally, in Chapter 5, I will advocate for three key recommendations that can 
improve the treatment of justice-involved 17-year-olds in Texas. First, the 85th Texas 
Legislature should take advantage of current practical and political realities and raise the 
age of criminal responsibility from 17 to 18 years old. Second, legislators should form a 
diverse task force that will meet regularly before the new policy goes into effect in order 
to anticipate implementation challenges and foster stakeholder collaboration. Finally, 
legislators should work with the task force to design a matching grant program through 
 8 
which counties may apply for aid as they begin to serve 17-year-olds within their local 
juvenile probation departments. 
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Chapter 2: 
Who Are They? Demographics of the Target Population 
Unlike the vast majority of their peers across the nation, 17-year-olds in Texas face 
the possibility of adult arrest and incarceration. In 2014, 514 Texans who were 17 at the 
time of their offense were admitted to adult prisons.18 In addition, 7,578 Texans who were 
17 at the time of their offense were under adult community supervision in 2014.19 
Over the past 15 years, Texas has seen a dramatic decrease in the number of 
teenagers arrested across the state. Between 2000 and 2014, the number of 17-year-olds 
arrested in Texas declined by about 45 percent.20 The number of 16-year-olds arrested in 
Texas faced a similar decline of 56 percent. Figure 2 illustrates this drop in arrests for both 
age groups. 
  
                                                 
18 U. Parks, Fiscal Note, 84th Legislative Regular Session in Re: HB 1205 by Dutton  [Memorandum] 
Austin, TX: Legislative Budget Board, April 1, 2015, 2, 
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/84R/fiscalnotes/pdf/HB01205I.pdf#navpanes=0  
19 Ibid, 2.  
20 Texas Department of Public Safety, Crime in Texas Reports (2000-2014), 
http://dps.texas.gov/administration/crime_records/pages/crimestatistics.htm.  
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Figure 2. Decline in Arrests Among 16- and 17-Year-Old Texans 
 
Source: Texas Department of Public Safety, Crime in Texas Reports (2000-2014), 
http://dps.texas.gov/administration/crime_records/pages/crimestatistics.htm.  
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF 17-YEAR-OLDS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Three key features characterize teenagers entangled in the justice system. These 
features (described below in further detail) include:  
 Teens who identify with racial and ethnic minority groups are overrepresented in 
the justice system. 
 Males make up the vast majority of justice-involved 17-year-olds in Texas. 
 Many justice-involved 17-year-olds have trauma histories and mental health 
treatment needs. 
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At most steps of the American justice system, minority groups fare worse than their 
white counterparts do.21 Unfortunately, teenagers trapped in the adult justice system adhere 
to the same trends.22 In 2013, researchers studied the racial and ethnic backgrounds of 16- 
and 17-year-olds arrested in New York, where both age groups are automatically treated 
as adults after committing a crime. The researchers found that 70 percent of youth who 
were arrested and 80 percent of youth who were sentenced to incarceration were either 
Black or Latino.23 Though less severe than New York’s data, nationwide statistics show 
similar racial and ethnic disparities among justice-involved teens. Figure 3 demonstrates 
the racial and ethnic breakdown of youth incarcerated in adult prisons and jails across the 
country. 
 
  
                                                 
21 The Sentencing Project, Incorporating Racial Equity into Criminal Justice Reform (2014): 3, 
http://www.safetyandjusticechallenge.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/incorporating-racial-equity-into-
criminal-justice-reform.pdf.  
22 The Sentencing Project, Disproportionate Minority Contact in the Juvenile Justice System (May 2014): 
7, http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Disproportionate-Minority-Contact-in-the-
Juvenile-Justice-System.pdf.  
23 Raise the Age New York, Get the Facts, accessed December 2015, http://raisetheageny.com/get-the-
facts. 
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Figure 3. Racial and Ethnic Backgrounds of Youth in the Adult Justice System 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Youth in Adult Prisons and Jails: A National Assessment  (October 2000), 
40, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182503.pdf. 
 
Males are also overrepresented in the justice system. In 2014, 17-year-old males 
were arrested for three times as many crimes as 17-year-old females.24 Other than 
prostitution and human trafficking crimes, 17-year-old males were arrested more times in 
every crime category than their female peers.25 
This gender discrepancy could result from a difference in criminal activity between 
males and females. Research shows that men are more likely than women to commit 
crimes, engage in violent behavior, and reoffend more quickly.26 However, the gender 
disparity could also be attributed to differences in how the justice system responds to 
individuals who commit crimes. For example, in a 2011 study, the Bureau of Justice 
                                                 
24 Texas Department of Public Safety, 2014 Crime in Texas (2015): 76-79, 
http://dps.texas.gov/crimereports/14/citCh9.pdf.  
25 Ibid, 76-79. 
26 A.G. Crocker, K. Hartford, and L. Heslop, “Gender Differences in Police Encounters Among Persons 
With and Without Serious Mental Illness,” Psychiatric Services 60, no. 1 (2009): 86-87. 
 13 
Statistics found that men experience more face-to-face contact with police officers.27 
Further, though men and women are equally likely to receive a traffic ticket from police, 
men are more likely to be arrested following a traffic stop, while women are more likely to 
receive a warning.28 These differences in response do not cease upon arrest. Rather, women 
are more likely than men to be routed to jail diversion programs, such as mental health 
courts, when they enter the justice system.29 In contrast, males (particularly men of color) 
are more likely to be terminated from diversion programs and sentenced to traditiona l 
periods of incarceration.30 
Finally, many justice-involved 17-year-olds struggle with mental health conditions 
and histories of trauma. Teenagers in the justice system are reportedly three times more 
likely to experience mental illness than youth outside of the justice system.31 Further, 75 
percent of these teens have not only been exposed to violence, crime, and abuse; they have 
also experienced traumatic victimization themselves.32 These experiences can contribute 
to the development of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which is disproportiona te ly 
found among youth in the justice system.33 Figure 4 demonstrates the stark differences in 
                                                 
27 C. Eith, and M.R. Durose, “Contacts Between Police and the Public, 2008,” Bureau of Justice Statistics 
Special Report Series (2011): 5, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp08.pdf. 
28 Ibid, 9. 
29 B. Ray and M. Brooks Dollar, “Examin ing Mental Health Court Completion: A Focal Concerns 
Perspective,” The Sociological Quarterly 54, no. 4 (2013): 659. 
30 Ibid, 659. 
31 National Conference of State Legislatures, Adolescent Development & Competency: Juvenile Justice 
Guide Book for Legislators, accessed March 2016, 8, http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jjguidebook-
adolescent.pdf.  
32 National Center for Mental Health and Juvenile Justice, Strengthening Our Future: Key Elements to 
Developing a Trauma-Informed Juvenile Justice Diversion Program for Youth with Behavioral Health 
Conditions (2015): 1, 
http://www.ncmhjj.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/traumadoc012216-reduced-003.pdf. 
33 R.L Listenbee, “PTSD, Trauma, and Comorbid Psychiatric Disorders in Detained Youth,” U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention , 
(June 2013): 2, http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/239603.pdf. 
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mental health-related backgrounds between youth in the justice system and youth in the 
general population. 
 
Figure 4. Mental Health-Related Backgrounds of Youth in the General Population and 
Youth in the Justice System 
 
Source: National Center for Mental Health and Juvenile Justice, Strengthening Our Future (2015): 1, 
http://www.ncmhjj.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/traumadoc012216-reduced-003.pdf 
 
Taken together, the three characteristics described above convey a troubling truth: 
Texas’ age of criminal responsibility does not impact all 17-year-olds equally. Rather, the 
brunt of Texas’ age policy disproportionately falls on young males of color who have 
mental health treatment needs. 
WHAT CRIMES ARE 17-YEAR-OLD TEXANS COMMITTING? 
In 2014, 17-year-olds were arrested for about 24,000 offenses committed across 
Texas, representing less than 3 percent of total adult arrests for the year.34 The teenagers’ 
                                                 
34 Texas Department of Public Safety, 2014 Crime in Texas (2015): 76-79, 
http://dps.texas.gov/crimereports/14/citCh9.pdf. 
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offenses ranged from minor disorderly conduct to homicide. This wide range of alleged 
criminal activity raises a key question: what crimes are most 17-year-olds committing to 
land themselves in the criminal justice system? 
The Myth of Teenage Super-Predators 
In the 1980s and 1990s, criminologists answered this question by creating the myth 
of the “teenage super-predator.”35 As the use of crack cocaine and private gun ownership 
increased across America, so too did violent juvenile crime rates.36 Ivy League politica l 
scientist John DiIulio used the increase in violent juvenile crime to paint a picture for 
Americans of “radically impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters”37 who were more 
likely to “pack guns instead of lunches.”38 In his book Body Count (1996), DiIulio and his 
co-authors predicted an unprecedented rise in youth violence over time; they also cautioned 
readers against engaging with the “youngest, biggest, and baddest generation any society 
has ever known.”39 
Dialogue about supposed teenage super-predators was not used to define all youth 
who committed crimes; rather, DiIulio’s language was racially coded.40 His book and 
subsequent articles warned readers about the spread of crimes beyond inner cities – a term 
used to capture any area where youth belonging to racial and ethnic minority groups might 
congregate. DiIulio also developed a theory of origin for burgeoning super-predators: 
                                                 
35 N. Bernstein, Burning Down the House: The End of Juvenile Prison  (New York: The New Press, 2014): 
71-80. 
36 Ibid, 72. 
37 W.J. Bennett, J.J. DiIulio, and J.P. Walters, Body Count: Moral Poverty and How to Win America’s War 
Against Crime and Drugs (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996): 27.  
38 J.J. DiIulio, “The Coming of the Super-Predators,” The Weekly Standard, November 27, 1995, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-coming-of-the-super-predators/article/8160. 
39 N. Bernstein, Burning Down the House: The End of Juvenile Prison  (New York: The New Press, 2014): 
72. 
40 Equal Justice Initiative, The Super-Predator Myth, 20 Years Later, April 2014, 
http://www.eji.org/node/893.  
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raised in homes where abuse was common and parental love was nowhere to be found, 
these teenagers were marred by “abject moral poverty” and were therefore incapable of 
feeling loyalty to anyone beyond their fellow gang members.41 
The myth of the teenage super-predator spread public fear until the early 2000s 
when DiIulio’s predictions about youth violence proved utterly false. He projected that 
juvenile arrests across the nation would increase by 30 percent.42 As illustrated in Figure 2 
(page 10), Texas experienced substantial decreases in arrests of both 16- and 17-year-
olds.43 Further, DiIulio warned that “teenage terrorists” would grow up “to do what comes 
naturally: murder, rape, rob, assault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get high.”44 In 
reality, however, the vast majority of crimes committed by youth are misdemeanors. Table 
1 lists the top ten most common offenses for which 17-year-old Texans were arrested in 
2014.45 Within this list, law enforcement officials may automatically classify only three 
offense types (or 11 percent of top ten arrests) as felonies. So-called super-predators are 
thus more likely to come in contact with the justice system for committing minor, 
nonviolent crimes, such as larceny theft and marijuana possession, than for murder and 
rape. 
 
  
                                                 
41 J.J. DiIulio, “The Coming of the Super-Predators,” The Weekly Standard, November 27, 1995, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-coming-of-the-super-predators/article/8160. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Texas Department of Public Safety, Crime in Texas Reports (2000-2014), 
http://dps.texas.gov/administration/crime_records/pages/crimestatistics.htm. 
44 J.J. DiIulio, “The Coming of the Super-Predators,” The Weekly Standard, November 27, 1995, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-coming-of-the-super-predators/article/8160. 
45 The figure was created using data from Texas Department of Public Safety, 2014 Crime in Texas (2015): 
76-79, http://dps.texas.gov/crimereports/14/citCh9.pdf. 
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Table 1. Arrests of 17-Year-Old Texans in 2014 
Offense Type Classification 
Total Offenses 
in 2014 
Larceny Theft (non-motor vehicle) 
Depends on the value of 
property taken 
5,061 
Marijuana Possession 
Depends on the amount in 
possession 
3,685 
Assaults (non-aggravated) Misdemeanor 2,328 
Drunkenness Misdemeanor 1,048 
Liquor Laws Misdemeanor 997 
Burglary Felony 847 
Disorderly Conduct Misdemeanor 651 
Vandalism Misdemeanor 523 
Aggravated Assault Felony 470 
Robbery Felony 379 
Source: Texas Department of Public Safety, 2014 Crime in Texas (2015): 76, 
http://dps.texas.gov/crimereports/14/citCh9.pdf.  
 
Though the super-predator myth was discredited, its impact still persists. In the 
1990s, states across the nation responded to growing fears of delinquent youth by passing 
laws that made it easier to try young children as adults.46 Over 25 years later, those laws 
continue to alter the lives of American youth. 
In Texas specifically, super-predator rhetoric still influences lawmakers. In 2015, 
the 84th Texas Legislature had the opportunity to raise the age of criminal responsibility to 
18 years old, but Senator John Whitmire (who chairs the Senate Criminal Justice 
                                                 
46 N. Bernstein, Burning Down the House: The End of Juvenile Prison  (New York: The New Press, 2014): 
75. 
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Committee) opposed the change, citing the trouble that violent 17-year-olds could bring to 
the juvenile system.47 Legislators feared that introducing 17-year-olds to juvenile detention 
facilities would place younger, more vulnerable youth at risk. Arrest data, however, show 
that, despite these fears, the vast majority of 17-year-olds are not incarcerated for 
committing life-threatening acts of violence. 
Seventeen-year-olds in Texas are often mistakenly typecast as “stone-cold 
predators,”48 and unfortunately, this mistake produces long-lasting negative consequences. 
Texas’ treatment of justice-involved teens as adults does not make the public safer. Instead, 
it simply puts these teens at greater risk for their own victimization. The next chapter will 
analyze the high victimization rates and other negative impacts that result when Texans 
treat 17-year-olds as adults in the justice system. 
  
                                                 
47 P. Michels, “Too Young to Jail,” The Texas Observer, May 12, 2015, 
http://www.texasobserver.org/texas-juvenile-justice-reform-and-raising-age-of-criminal-responsibility/.  
48 J.J. DiIulio, “The Coming of the Super-Predators,” The Weekly Standard, November 27, 1995, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-coming-of-the-super-predators/article/8160. 
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Chapter 3: 
Individual Impacts of Treating 17-Year-Olds as Adults in the Texas 
Criminal Justice System 
Texas predominately arrests 17-year-olds for minor offenses, but the impacts of an 
adult arrest and conviction are far from minor. Chapter 3 will review existing literature to 
address one crucial question: what physical, psychological, developmental, and economic 
impacts do 17-year-olds face in the adult criminal justice system? The impacts discussed 
in this chapter include: 
 Physical and sexual victimization; 
 Psychological damages that arise from adult imprisonment and solitary 
confinement; 
 Developmental delays resulting from a lack of treatment, educational services, and 
positive socialization; and  
 Future economic losses for 17-year-olds with an adult criminal record. 
PHYSICAL IMPACTS 
In adult facilities, 17-year-olds face threats to their personal safety. The teens 
experience higher rates of violence (particularly sexual violence) than both older inmates 
housed in adult facilities and younger teens housed in juvenile facilities.49 
A mixture of individual inmate characteristics, staffing structures, and cultura l 
attitudes combine to facilitate physical and sexual violence against incarcerated 17-year-
olds. First, most 17-year-olds are smaller in size, more inexperienced in the criminal justice 
system, and less cognitively and socially developed than incarcerated adults. These 
                                                 
49 M. Deitch, R. Breeden, and R. Weingarten, “Seventeen, Going on Eighteen: An Operational and Fiscal 
Analysis of a Proposal to Raise the Age of Juvenile Jurisdiction in Texas,” American Journal of Criminal 
Law 40, no. 1 (2012): 13. http://ajclonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/40-1-Deitch.pdf.  
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individual attributes hinder the teenagers’ ability to defend themselves against violent 
attacks.50 Second, while the average staff-to-detainee ratio in juvenile facilities is 1:8, the 
average staff-to-inmate ratio in adult facilities is 1:64.51 Less consistent and intensive 
supervision allows violence to occur more frequently in adult facilities than in juvenile 
detention centers. Third, differing cultures dominate juvenile and adult correctional 
settings. In juvenile facilities, Texas teens under 17 benefit from a rehabilitative, youth-
oriented atmosphere, while 17-year-olds in adult facilities must endure a more punitive, 
security-focused environment. The culture within adult correctional facilities decreases 17-
year-olds’ feelings of trust and their willingness to report violent victimization.52  
Physical Violence 
The placement of youth in adult facilities was intended to decrease rates of violence 
among teenagers in the general population.53 Criminologists justified youth incarceration 
by citing the deterrence hypothesis: with the threat of adult prison looming before them, 
17-year-olds and their younger peers were expected to decrease their own violent behaviors 
in order to avoid punishments in the adult justice system.54 Research, however, debunks 
                                                 
50 J. Mariner, “No Escape: Male Rape in U.S. Prisons,” Human Rights Watch, accessed January 11, 2016, 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report.html.  
51 A. Wood, “Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Confining Juveniles with Adults After Graham and Miller,” 
Emory Law Journal 61 (2012): 1453, 
http://law.emory.edu/elj/_documents/volumes/61/6/comments/wood.pdf. 
52 N. Arya, “Jailing Juveniles: The Dangers of Incarcerating Youth in Adult Jails in America,” The 
Campaign for Youth Justice (November 2007): 13, 
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJ-
Jailing_Juveniles_Report_2007-11-15.pdf.  
53 R. Hahn et al., “Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the Transfer of Youth from the 
Juvenile to the Adult Justice System,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  (November 2007), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5609a1.htm.  
54 H. Entorf, “Expected Recidivism Among Young Offenders: Comparing Specific Deterrence Under 
Juvenile and Adult Criminal Law,” European Journal of Political Economy 28, no. 4 (2012): 415. 
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this hypothesis. Instead, analysts find that teenagers are too shortsighted and cognitive ly 
underdeveloped to view adult imprisonment as a deterrent against impulsive behavior.55 
While adult incarceration does not deter teenage crime outside of prison walls, the 
practice does impact violence inside cellblocks. In a study of youth transfers to adult 
prisons, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) found that the placement 
of children under 18 in adult facilities tends to increase rates of violence among these youth 
by adding a vulnerable group to a tense environment.56 The adult correctional system is 
already a dangerous place; incarcerated people in adult settings are up to 11 times more 
likely than children in juvenile detention centers to require medical attention following an 
inmate-on- inmate attack.57 Introducing 17-year-old youth into adult prisons does not 
appear to decrease the teenagers’ own violent behavior. Instead, this practice merely adds 
a defenseless, inexperienced group to the adult justice system, which exacerbates existing 
violence in these facilities. 
Teenagers in the adult criminal justice system do not only face the risk of violence 
perpetrated by other inmates. Incarcerated people under 18 are also two times more likely 
than older inmates to report beatings at the hands of prison staff.58 Further, these teens are 
50 percent more likely than older inmates to be attacked with a weapon.59 Injuries sustained 
during these beatings can be severe. For example, between 2012 and 2013 alone, 16- and 
17-year-old jail inmates on New York’s Rikers Island suffered 754 visible injur ies, 
                                                 
55 Ibid, 415. 
56 R. Hahn et al., “Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the Transfer of Youth from the 
Juvenile to the Adult Justice System,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention  (November 2007), 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5609a1.htm. 
57 V. Schiraldi and J. Zeidenberg, “The Risks Juveniles Face When They Are Incarcerated with Adults,” 
The Justice Policy Institute (1997): 2, http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/97-
02_rep_riskjuvenilesface_jj.pdf. 
58 Ibid, 3. 
59 Ibid, 3. 
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including broken jaws, long bone fractures, and lacerations requiring stitches.60 In 2013, 
emergency alarms indicating serious altercations or disturbances were used about three 
times per day in the Rikers Island adolescent housing areas.61 Thus, New York’s most 
vulnerable incarcerated population must survive in units plagued by the most turmoil and 
chaos. Like New York, Texas continues to house individuals under 18 in adult correctional 
facilities, despite the pervasive violence that teens disproportionately face at the hands of 
staff members and other incarcerated persons. 
Sexual Violence 
Rodney Hulin, Jr.’s experience of repeated sexual victimization in a Texas prison 
is not unique. Teenagers in adult prisons and jails across the nation report troubling rates 
of sexual victimization. In 2009, a federal commission studying prison rape found that 
people under 18 who are incarcerated with adults face the highest risk of sexual abuse in 
U.S. prisons.62 Commission members reported that youth are five times more likely than 
adults to be sexually assaulted while they are incarcerated.63 Among those who have been 
sexually victimized, incarcerated individuals under age 18 are also eight times more likely 
than the average inmate to experience a substantiated incident of abuse (i.e., an assault that 
officials determine is “supported by a preponderance of evidence” after an investiga t ion 
concludes).64 
                                                 
60 U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney of the Southern District of New York, CRIPA Investigation of 
the New York City Department of Correction Jails on Rik ers Island (August 2014): 7, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/05/nyregion/05rikers -report.html.  
61 Ibid, 8. 
62 National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, National Prison Rape Elimination Commission Report  
(June 2009): 18, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf.  
63 Ibid, 42. 
64 National Archives and Records Administration, Federal Register: National Standards to Prevent, 
Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape Final Rule , 77, no. 119 (2012): 37128, 
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High rates of sexual assault among confined youth are not a new phenomenon. In 
a 1989 study, nine percent of youth confined in adult prisons reported that other inmates 
had raped or attempted to rape them during their period of imprisonment; in contrast, about 
two percent of youth in juvenile facilities reported the same experience.65 In 1993, 
researchers also found that the odds of sexual victimization were eight times higher for an 
adult prison’s youngest inmates than for its older inmates.66 Decades later, 17-year-olds 
are still at risk. In 2009, people under 18 made up only one percent of the U.S. jail 
population, but they represented 21 percent of substantiated incidents of sexual assault in 
jail facilities.67  
Texas teens in adult prisons are at particular risk for sexual victimization. In 2007, 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) conducted its first National Inmate Survey (NIS) to 
review and analyze the incidence of prison rape across the United States. In the study, 
researchers identified ten adult prisons with the highest prevalence rates of sexual 
victimization in the country; Texas was home to five of those facilities.68 In a 2013 follow-
up study, BJS analysts again named facilities with the highest rates of sexual violence. 
Researchers identified 11 male prisons with the highest rates of inmate-on- inmate sexual 
                                                 
65 M. Forst, J. Fagan, and T. Scott Vivona, “Youth in Prisons and Training Schools: Perceptions and 
Consequences of the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy,” Juvenile & Family Court Journal 40, no. 1 (1989): 
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67 National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, National Prison Rape Elimination Commission Report  
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Allred Unit (Wichita County), the Mountain View Unit (Coryell County), and the Coffield Unit (Anderson 
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and Federal Prisons Reported by Inmates, 2007,” Bureau of Justice Statistics (2007): 2, 
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victimization; three were located in Texas.69  BJS also found eight male prisons with the 
highest rates of staff sexual misconduct; two were located in Texas.70 One Texas facility 
stood out among the rest – the Clements Unit in Potter County. Individuals incarcerated 
within the Clements Unit reported two troubling statistics. First, they experienced the 
highest rate of sexual assaults that involved physical force or the threat of force by staff.71 
Second, they experienced the highest rate of coercion to engage in sexual activity without 
the use or threat of force by staff;72 despite this lack of force, incarcerated individuals have 
little power compared to prison staff members, which precludes inmates from legally 
consenting to engage in sexual activity. 
For teenagers, sexual victimization often occurs within only two days of 
incarceration.73 For others, like T.J. Parsell, the abuse starts even sooner. At 17 years old, 
Parsell pulled out a toy gun at a local Fotomat and stole $53 from the cashier.74 He was 
quickly arrested for armed robbery. Soon after, he sat across from a prison psychologist for 
an evaluation before he was formally admitted to one of Michigan’s most notorious adult 
correctional facilities. The psychologist glanced at Parsell’s skinny frame and warned the 
                                                 
69 The three Texas prisons were: the Stiles Unit (Jefferson County), the Montford Psychiatric Facility 
(Lubbock County), and the Clements Unit (Potter County). See A. Beck, M. Berzofsky, R. Caspar, and C. 
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74 T.J. Parsell, “Unsafe Behind Bars,” The New York Times, September 18, 2005, 
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teenager about the abuse he would likely face. In his memoir, Fish, Parsell described the 
interaction:75 
“A pretty boy like you,” the psychologist added, “you’ll need to get a man. If you 
don’t get a man, you’ll be open game.” 
“They’ll have to kill me first,” I said, sitting up in my chair. 
“That can be arranged,” he said, calmly. 
On Parsell’s first day in an adult prison, the psychologist’s prediction came true. 
Parsell was drugged and gang raped within hours of arriving at the facility. Then, his 
abusers flipped a coin to determine who would “own” the 17-year-old for the duration of 
his sentence. For five years, Parsell lived as “sexual chattel,” but the impacts of his abuse 
did not end when his sentence did.76 
The consequences of sexual assault in an adult correctional facility are long-last ing. 
Repeated abuses increase a young person’s probability of contracting HIV/AIDS, the 
incidence of which is five times higher in adult prisons than in the general population. 77 
Sexual victimization may also cause teens to act out in disruptive ways in order to decrease 
their appearance of vulnerability or to obtain placement in solitary confinement away from 
their predators, like Rodney Hulin, Jr. did in the Clemens Unit. Disruptive behaviors can 
sever the youth’s access to evidence-based programming while he or she is kept in 
segregation. Further, disruptive behavior may negatively impact future parole board 
decisions and ultimately lengthen a 17-year-old’s stay within the dangerous prison 
environment. Finally, sexual victimization can cause teens to display psychiatr ic 
                                                 
75 The interaction presented here was condensed slightly to remove explicit language. See T.J. Parsell, 
Fish: A Memoir of a Boy in a Man’s Prison  (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2006), xi. 
76 T.J. Parsell, “In Prison, Teenagers Become Prey,” The New York Times, June 5, 2012, 
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symptoms, such as suicidal ideation, self-harm behaviors, and delusions, either due to 
mental deterioration or as a means to gain access to a mental health professional.78 
Decades after Parsell’s release from prison, he confessed that he still experienced 
psychiatric symptoms related to PTSD as a result of his sexual abuse. “I’m remorseful 
about the actions of my youth, and I accept responsibility for the choices I made,” Parsell 
stated almost 30 years after his first day of incarceration, “but no one deserves to be 
raped.”79 
Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 
Correctional administrators and policymakers recognized prison violence and rape 
as a problem as early as 1934.80 However, lawmakers did not pass formal legislation to 
address the issue until almost 70 years later. In 2003, Congress unanimously passed the 
Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) to implement a zero-tolerance policy for sexual 
violence in places of incarceration. The act created the National Prison Rape Elimina tion 
Commission to investigate the problem and to design standards aimed at decreasing sexual 
violence in prisons, jails, and other detention settings. 
Most importantly, PREA included the “Youthful Inmate Standard” to further 
protect incarcerated youth who are at greater risk of physical and sexual victimization. The 
act defined “youthful inmates” as incarcerated individuals under 18 years old, a standard 
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which diverges from Texas’ age of criminal responsibility. To comply with the federal 
standard, facility administrators must follow three requirements:81 
1. First, inmates under 18 in adult facilities may not be placed in housing units where 
they could have direct contact with adult inmates. 
2. Second, outside of housing units, incarcerated individuals under 18 must remain 
out of “sight and sound” of all adult inmates. If youthful inmates are within sight 
and sound of adult inmates, the facility must provide adequate supervision to keep 
the groups from interacting. 
3. Third, to comply with the first two requirements, facility administrators should not 
place youthful inmates in prolonged isolation. Administrators must also ensure that 
inmates under 18 are still given the educational and recreational services to which 
youth are entitled.  
Unlike federal facilities, state prisons and county jails are not statutorily bound to 
comply with PREA. However, states that fail to meet PREA standards could ultima te ly 
lose five percent of their federal funding.82 The Youthful Inmate Standard complicates 
some states’ ability to fully comply with PREA. Forced to separate 17-year-olds by sight 
and sound from the adult prison population, facility administrators must reserve entire units 
for small groups of youthful inmates. Administrators must also shut down entire adult units 
to ensure that the age groups do not interact with one another when staff members transport 
youthful inmates to the facility’s recreational and medical service areas. This practice 
                                                 
81 National PREA Resource Center, Youthful Inmates, February 2013, 
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82 J. Cushman, Jr., “U.S. Issues Far-Reaching Rules to Stem Prison Rape,” The New York Times, May 17, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/18/us/politics/us -sets-first-comprehensive-rules-to-stem-prison-
rape.html?_r=0. 
 28 
disrupts the adult population’s activities, co-opts limited staff resources and time, and 
disincentivizes administrators from providing essential services to 17-year-olds. 
Difficulties with compliance lead some states to ignore PREA regulations and 
forfeit federal dollars. Other states, like Kansas, transfer all youthful inmates with adult 
convictions to other states entirely in order to avoid the costs of housing teenagers 
separately.83 Finally, some facilities (particularly jails) that lack the physical space to 
segregate 17-year-olds place the teens in isolated cells, which can both create and 
exacerbate symptoms of mental illness.84 (For more information on solitary confinement 
and mental illness, see pages 31-34.) 
Since PREA’s passing, Texas policymakers have voiced clashing opinions about 
implementing the act in state prisons and county jails. In 2014, then-Governor Rick Perry 
described PREA standards as “counterproductive and unnecessarily cumbersome.”85 In a 
letter to former Attorney General Eric Holder, Perry asserted that PREA standards and 
compliance dates were “impossible” for many states to meet and that Texas would not 
spend its limited resources trying to do so.86 At that time, however, at least ten other 
governors had already provided Holder with assurances that their states were successfully 
working toward established compliance deadlines.87 In 2015, newly-elected Governor 
Greg Abbott assured federal officials that Texas would attempt to implement PREA 
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standards “wherever feasible.”88 That same year, Texas policymakers tried and failed to 
raise the age of criminal responsibility to 18 years old, which would have eased PREA 
compliance efforts across the state. 
Now, Texas correctional leaders face a difficult choice. They may choose to retrofit 
correctional facilities (primarily jails) so that 17-year-olds can be housed separately from 
adult inmates. Alternatively, leaders may refuse to pay the substantial costs associated with 
retrofitting their facilities, especially in jails where it may be nearly impossible to 
architecturally ensure sight and sound separation between youth and adult inmates; as a 
result, Texas would lose federal dollars currently dedicated to prison and jail management. 
This loss in funding could be substantial. Between 2004 and 2013, Texas 
correctional facilities received more PREA-authorized grants than any other state.89 In 
2014 alone, Texas lost over $800,000 in federal funds due to PREA noncompliance.90 The 
Legislative Budget Board (LBB) estimated that the state could lose an additional $2.78 
million between 2016 and 2017, an amount that is far from inconsequential while falling 
oil and gas prices continue to strain the state’s budget.91 
In addition to losing federal funding, Texas correctional officials who choose to 
ignore PREA standards may face another expensive threat – litigation from incarcerated 
and formerly incarcerated individuals. In 2014, a formerly incarcerated man in Travis 
County sued local jail officials for $2 million in damages over a rape he survived while he 
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was incarcerated.92 The man’s attorney stated that the county officials managing the facility 
“demonstrated a careless, wanton, conscious, and reckless disregard for the safety of the 
plaintiff” and argued that more could have been done to prevent the attack.93 Simila r 
lawsuits could follow if judges view PREA noncompliance as evidence of the 
government’s deliberate indifference to inmate safety. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACTS 
Treating 17-year-olds as adults in the Texas criminal justice system not only places 
the teenagers in physical danger; the practice also jeopardizes their mental health. Research 
shows that teens tried in the adult justice system have similar psychiatric diagnoses to 
children adjudicated in the juvenile system when the two groups are first processed by 
court officials.94 However, after only short periods of confinement, children under 18 in 
adult prisons experience drastically different psychological outcomes than their peers in 
juvenile detention centers. 
For example, justice-involved youth are 36 times more likely to commit suicide in 
adult facilities than they are in juvenile facilities.95 The risk of suicide is particularly high 
during a teen’s first week of incarceration. Jolted by the initial shock of confinement, 
people who have not yet been convicted are seven times more likely to commit suicide 
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than their convicted peers.96 Smaller jail settings bear the highest suicide rates.97 In these 
facilities, jail administrators lack the resources that they need to provide teens with 
sufficient mental health services and to house 17-year-olds separately from older inmates 
without the use of solitary confinement. As a result, these teenagers face heightened risks 
of assault, mental deterioration, and suicide. 
High rates of mental illness and suicide among incarcerated 17-year-olds stem from 
traumatic experiences both inside and outside of adult correctional institutions. Before 
entering the justice system, these teenagers experience relatively high rates of mental 
illness, substance use disorders, and abuse.98 Once incarcerated, they often develop fears 
of physical and sexual assault that can lead to depression, PTSD, anxiety, persistent 
distrust, and withdrawal.99 Rather than breaking the cycle of criminality, incarcerating 
teenagers in adult facilities tends to exacerbate mental illness, increase recidivism, and 
ultimately reinforce the revolving door between freedom and confinement.100 
Confronted by high rates of youth victimization and suicide, Texas prison and jail 
administrators must make difficult choices regarding the treatment of vulnerable 17-year-
olds. Limited resources and architectural barriers often force correctional leaders to place 
their small population of 17-year-olds in isolation. Colloquially termed “solitary 
confinement,” the use of isolation involves a troubling paradox: though secluded housing 
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protects youthful inmates from potential predators, the practice also causes severe 
psychological harms. 
When an inmate is placed in solitary confinement, he or she is kept in a small cell 
without sensory stimulation, recreation, or outside socialization for up to 22 hours each 
day.101 At a developmental stage when teenagers require interaction, incarcerated 17-year-
olds instead begin to lose their capacity to relate to others. Research shows that individua ls 
under 18 are not psychologically capable of handling solitary confinement with the same 
resilience of an adult.102 As a result, a teen’s long-lasting reactions to isolation may include 
but are not limited to:103 
 Visual and auditory hallucinations and delusions; 
 Mood swings; 
 Hypersensitivity to stimuli; 
 Depression; 
 Self-harm, suicidal ideation, and suicide attempts; 
 Anxiety and paranoia; 
 Loss of cognitive functioning; 
 Nightmares and insomnia; and 
 Uncontrollable rage or anger. 
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Each of these symptoms can harm an individual’s ability to build healthy 
relationships, develop important life skills, and reduce criminal behaviors later in life.  
Placement in solitary confinement can even prove fatal. 
In 2010, 16-year-old Kalief Browder was arrested for a robbery that he insisted he 
did not commit.104 Because he was in New York, he was automatically treated as an adult 
within the justice system. In total, Browder spent over 1,000 days in a Rikers Island jail 
awaiting a trial that would never occur.105 For about two years of his incarceration, he was 
housed in solitary confinement, where he was starved, beaten, and denied access to 
adequate educational services and mental health treatment.106 Over time, he grew paranoid 
and anxious as he waited for his trial and his next attack. He attempted suicide mult ip le 
times, only to be brought back to his solitary cell after he received crisis services. 
After three years of incarceration, Browder’s case was dismissed, and he was 
released into the busy streets of New York. Though he was back home with his family, 
Browder described that he felt “mentally scarred” – his flashbacks were frequent, he 
remained quiet and distant, and he felt constantly terrified.107 “I feel like I was robbed of 
my happiness,” Browder stated in 2014 months after his release.108 Following multip le 
suicide attempts, Browder was in and out of a New York state hospital for psychiatr ic 
treatment, but there was no escape from his experience as a teenager in an adult jail. “In 
my mind right now, I feel like I’m still in jail,” Browder described. “I’m still feeling the 
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side effects from what happened in there.”109 In June 2015, he could no longer manage the 
impacts of adult incarceration and solitary confinement. Less than two weeks after his 22nd 
birthday, Browder tied a cord around his neck and jumped to his death in his mother’s 
home.110  
DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACTS 
Seventeen-year-olds face greater threats to body and mind in adult facilities than 
they would in juvenile detention centers. If they are able to endure these trying physical 
and psychological dangers, the teenagers’ healthy development is still hindered in three 
significant ways. First, despite the teens’ well-documented mental health and substance 
use treatment needs, Texas prisons and jails often fail to provide the services and 
programming that youth require to succeed. Second, while juvenile facilities provide 
regular school activities, many adult facilities lack the necessary resources to supply 17-
year-olds with legally-mandated educational services. Third, the socializa t ion 
opportunities available to teens in adult facilities tend to increase criminality, not reduce it. 
Treatment Needs 
After only a short period of time within the criminal justice system, youth in adult 
facilities develop greater treatment needs than their younger peers in juvenile facilities. In 
a 2009 study, researchers showed that 17-year-old Texans confined in adult prisons 
demonstrated higher levels of distress across almost every clinical category than similar 
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youth detained in juvenile facilities.111 Using the nationally-recognized Massachusetts 
Youth Screening Instrument (MAYSI-2), researchers discovered that about 90 percent of 
teens in the adult system had significant mental health treatment needs.112 Other researchers 
have published similar findings. In 2011, psychologists demonstrated that the odds of 
experiencing clinical depression are 37 times higher for teens in adult prisons than for 
youth in juvenile settings.113 Despite these clear needs among delinquent youth, access to 
sufficient treatment depends largely upon the age at which a teenager commits his or her 
crime. 
In Texas, if the adjudicated teen is 16 years old at arrest, he or she will be brought 
under the custody of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD), where the staff’s 
“fundamental philosophy” is to provide youth-centered, evidence-based treatment.114 In 
2015, TJJD reported on five specific treatment programs: 
1. Capital and serious violent offender treatment, 
2. Sexual behavior treatment,  
3. Alcohol and other drug treatment, 
4. Mental health treatment, and 
5. Gender-specific programming for females. 
Together, these programs significantly reduced recidivism and enhanced positive 
youth development among participants.115 In light of these strong outcomes, TJJD 
increased service provision by 32 percent between 2009 and 2015 to ensure that more 
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juveniles in need received the treatments that they required.116 Table 2 below shows that 
the vast majority of children in need of programming both enrolled in and completed 
TJJD’s data-driven treatments in 2014. 
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Table 2. Specialized Programming at Secure TJJD Facilities in FY 2014 
Program Description 
Percent of 
Juveniles in Need 
Who Enrolled in 
Treatment 
Percent of 
Juveniles in Need 
Who Completed 
Treatment 
Capital and 
Serious Violent 
Offender 
Treatment 
Program 
(CSVOTP) 
 Serves youth who are 
committed for murder, 
capital murder, and 
offenses involving the 
use of a weapon or 
deadly force. 
 Uses group therapy and 
role play to help youth 
understand how their 
feelings relate to their 
violent behaviors.  
98% 91% 
Sexual Behavior 
Treatment 
Program 
 
 Serves youth committed 
for sexual offenses. 
 Uses individual 
counseling, support 
groups, and cognitive 
behavioral therapy to 
prevent relapse. 
98% 85% 
Alcohol or 
Other Drug Use 
Treatment 
Programs 
(AODTP) 
 Serves youth with 
substance use issues and 
chemical dependencies.  
 Uses evidence-based 
treatment curricula to 
connect a juvenile’s 
criminal behavior to his 
or her personal history 
and use of drugs. 
99% 92% 
Mental Health 
Treatment 
Program 
(MHTP) 
 Serves youth with 
mental health 
conditions. 
 Treats the youth’s 
mental illness in order to 
allow the juvenile to 
gain control over his or 
her behavior and 
reintegrate into the 
community. 
85% 55% 
Source: Texas Juvenile Justice Department, The Annual Review of Treatment Effectiveness (December 2015). 
http://www.tjjd.texas.gov/Docs/TreatmentEffectivenessReview_2015.pdf. 
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In contrast, if a convicted teen is 17 years old at arrest, he or she will face drastically 
different treatment options. While TJJD prioritizes youth treatment, the Texas Department 
of Criminal Justice (TDCJ, the agency tasked with supervising incarcerated adults) 
prioritizes facility security. As a result, only about six percent of TDCJ’s 2016 operating 
budget was allocated to providing convicted individuals with rehabilitative services and 
directing incarcerated persons with special needs toward treatment programs.117 
Because the population of 17-year-olds in any given facility is small, providing 
separate treatment services for the teenagers is costly. Facility administrators may instead 
choose to withhold services from youthful inmates until they are 18 and can enroll in 
treatment programs with the general prison population. For example, while 92 percent of 
juveniles with a chemical dependency in TJJD facilities completed substance use treatment 
in 2014,118 17-year-olds with similar needs were not even eligible to enroll in TDCJ’s 
Substance Abuse Felony Treatment Program until they turned 18. 
Educational Needs 
Though 17-year-old Texans are viewed as adults within the justice system, the 
Texas Education Code still stipulates that teens of this age must receive educationa l 
services from local school districts.119 Youth incarcerated in adult facilities have high 
educational needs which are often unmet. For example, though nearly one-third of jail 
inmates under 24 years old have a learning disability, about 40 percent of jails surveyed by 
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the Bureau of Justice Statistics fail to provide detained individuals with any educationa l 
services at all.120 Only 11 percent of jails provide special education services to 
accommodate the youth population’s specific learning needs.121 
As described previously, prison and jail facilities often lack the physical space to 
offer 17-year-olds separate treatment and educational services. In addition, jails usually do 
not employ enough personnel to deliver these services. While juvenile detention settings 
have one teacher for every 15 students, adult correctional settings have only one teacher 
for every 100 students, which limits an educator’s ability to accommodate each individua l’s 
unique needs and strengths.122 This lack of educational opportunity not only increases the 
likelihood of a youthful inmate’s future engagement in criminal activity;123 the gap in 
services also presents a substantial liability concern for relevant stakeholders. For example, 
parents, juveniles, and youth advocates could pursue litigation against school district 
officials and facility administrators who fail to collaborate in providing incarcerated 
children with legally-mandated educational services. 
Slightly younger youth served by TJJD have similar educational needs, but they 
face different outcomes. In 2015, TJJD youth were about 3.6 years behind the general youth 
population in reading skills.124 To meet this need, TJJD staff and volunteers provided the 
juveniles with regular educational programming. Every day, TJJD youth attend classes 
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and/or vocational training that may be harnessed to secure employment upon release. Then, 
the children participate in skills-building exercises, behavioral groups, special treatment 
programs, and recreational activities. Each class and activity is designed to fill the youth’s 
time productively and emphasize their capacity for positive change. In contrast, TDCJ’s 
17-year-olds are viewed first and foremost as inmates and are often denied services that 
could engage the teens in intellectual growth. While TJJD produces graduates, TDCJ 
produces greater delinquency. 
Socialization Needs 
Incarcerated 17-year-olds in Texas may not receive the formal education that they 
require in adult correctional facilities, but they are still learning. Unfortunately, positive 
role models do not facilitate the teenagers’ education. Instead, youth in adult prisons and 
jails learn from their surrounding environment, where fear, power, and violence dictate 
daily living. 
At 17 years old, teens are at a crucial turning point in their social development. 
Highly malleable, these teenagers seek to master interpersonal functioning by learning 
from their families, teachers, and peers.125 Incarcerated 17-year-olds, however, are 
separated from their families, and they receive minimal interaction with teachers. Thus, 
their last vestige of social learning comes from their incarcerated peers. 
At this stage of their psychosocial development, 17-year-olds increasingly seek 
acceptance from their peers, an achievement that activates the reward-seeking areas of the 
brain.126 Teens also develop the ability to think abstractly, and they cultivate a deeper 
appreciation for experts. While serving time in TDCJ facilities, those “experts” are of the 
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criminal variety. While their peers in juvenile settings build relationships with positive 
adult role models, 17-year-olds in Texas prisons instead learn social skills from TDCJ’s 
inmate population. 
At TJJD facilities, juveniles develop their social identities in a variety of settings. 
First, they meet with case managers equipped with youth-specific training. Then, the teens 
may interact with their peers in skills application groups where they can learn how their 
internal thoughts and emotions support their external behaviors. For example, in 2010, 
TJJD began to use the Positive Behavior Intervention and Supports (PBIS) framework to 
holistically enhance prosocial, adaptive behaviors among adjudicated youth in secure state 
facilities.127 The PBIS strategy uses multidisciplinary teams to proactively strengthen 
children’s positive behaviors and engage family supports in the rehabilitative process. 
Seventeen-year-old Texans in adult prisons do not benefit from the same hands-on, 
family-centered socialization techniques. Instead, the parents of convicted 17-year-olds 
might not even be notified of their child’s arrest and confinement behaviors. Further, TDCJ 
staff members are unlikely to have youth-specific expertise or training. Thus, the only 
mentors available to incarcerated 17-year-olds are individuals who also occupy Texas 
cellblocks. Here, power struggles and intimidation rule relationships, forcing 17-year-olds 
to learn habits that may harden them against society rather than shape them into productive 
members of communities. 
In 1995, 16-year-old Glenn Martin of New York experienced the harsh 
socialization that defines adult incarceration on Rikers Island. In a speech delivered at the 
UT School of Social Work in April 2016, Martin described the immediate choice detained 
teenagers have to make: you can be a predator, or you can be prey. Martin decided to be a 
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predator, and, in return for his aggressive front, he was stabbed four times within his first 
week of confinement. 
As impressionable teens in an adult facility, Martin and his peers not only learned 
how to become better criminals; they also “learned how to live without hope.”128 His 
cellmate, however, gave Martin a glimpse of the humanity that these teenagers have to 
offer. During Martin’s first winter of incarceration, correctional officials opened the 
prison’s windows, exposing the inmates to extreme New York temperatures. Within hours, 
Martin developed a cold and sore throat. Martin’s new cellmate faced the same predator-
or-prey choice that all inmates do when they meet a fellow detainee, but the young man 
chose a novel option: using an elaborate system of contraband items, the cellmate made 
Martin a cup of tea. Decades later, Martin described that his cellmate’s offering of tea 
illustrated the potential that incarcerated teenagers possess, as well as the lengths to which 
adult prisons will go to crush it. 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
Incarcerated 17-year-old Texans face dangerous physical, psychological, and 
developmental impacts that combine to inflict current harm. Upon reentry into the 
community, the harm of a prison sentence is not yet complete. Once they are released, the 
teens also carry adult criminal records that damage their future livelihoods. Incarcerating 
youthful inmates halts 17-year-olds’ cultivation of human and social capital at a critical 
moment in their burgeoning economic lives.129 At the same time, these individua ls 
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accumulate criminal capital and adult convictions that alter their lifelong career 
trajectories. 
That change in trajectory can be substantial. Burdened with a criminal record, 
former felons experience difficulty in acquiring access to resources that could improve 
their economic stability, such as reliable housing, public benefits, student loans, and steady 
employment.130 In a 2010 study, the Pew Charitable Trusts and Economic Mobility Project 
uncovered significant lifelong damages to individuals who had been formerly incarcerated 
on felony charges.131 Post-incarceration, the former inmates’ hourly wages were reduced 
by 11 percent, their annual employment time was cut by nine weeks, and their annual 
earnings were 40 percent less than the earnings achieved by similar individuals who had 
never been incarcerated.132 By age 48, the typical former inmate lost about $179,000 in 
income.133 This value would likely be larger for 17-year-olds, as they are the youngest 
group in Texas to automatically face the state’s adult justice system. Their criminal records 
are thus tainted before the teens even start their careers, and those records may follow them 
for the duration of their working lives. 
Drastically different economic outcomes occur among teenagers with similar 
backgrounds and criminal histories who are placed either in the juvenile or adult justice 
system. In 2005, Jason Wang and two of his close friends robbed a family at gunpoint in 
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Mesquite, Texas.134 The trio was arrested, and their fates were brought into the hands of 
the Texas justice system. Wang was 15 at the time of the offense. As a result, he was 
adjudicated in the juvenile system, where he received programming, support, and the 
eventual sealing of his record. One of his friends was not so fortunate; he was 17 at the 
time of the offense and was taken into TDCJ custody where he received far fewer self-
improvement opportunities. In 2015, Wang had an MBA and owned two businesses. His 
friend, though similar in socioeconomic and delinquent background, was struggling to find 
work because of his adult criminal record.135 
Criminal records and depressed earnings do not only impact single individuals, like 
Wang’s partner in crime. Rather, they create a troubling cycle across generations. Trapped 
by a parent’s criminal conviction, poverty, and recidivism, the children of current and 
formerly incarcerated individuals are more likely than their peers to experience numerous 
negative outcomes, including:136 137 
 Physical and behavioral health problems; 
 Developmental delays; 
 Foster care placement; 
 Difficulty in school; 
 Unemployment; 
 Violent and/or delinquent behavior; and 
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 Their own incarceration, starting the sequence all over again. 
In contrast, youth served in the juvenile justice system may have their records 
expunged or sealed, breaking the generational cycle of economic decline and crimina lity 
before it begins. 
Adverse economic outcomes also impact a formerly incarcerated person’s broader 
community. While higher accumulations of human capital (such as wages, marketable 
skills, and years of education) increase the opportunity cost of criminal activity, lower 
levels of human capital decrease that opportunity cost;138 crime thus becomes more 
economically attractive to those with criminal records who have few legal opportunities to 
achieve financial stability within their communities. As a result, these individuals may 
become more likely to reoffend, which, in turn, increases community costs of policing, 
victimization, and incarceration. 
Vocational programming in adult prisons can help to prevent such harmful 
economic consequences. For every $1 spent on these skill-based programs, communit ies 
experience almost $13 in net benefits.139 However, 17-year-olds often lack access to these 
programs until they are old enough to join the general inmate population. Unfortunate ly, 
in even a short period of time, the teens can experience mental deterioration and declines 
in healthy development that combine to decrease program effectiveness. 
EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE 
The evidence discussed in this chapter demonstrates the detrimental effects of 
automatically funneling 17-year-olds into the adult criminal justice system. Still, current 
research suffers from three major drawbacks. 
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First, statistics describing the treatment of 17-year-olds are likely underestimated. 
The underreporting problem is particularly significant for data concerning sexual violence 
against incarcerated 17-year-olds. For one assault to make it into the data, several crucial 
but challenging steps must be taken.140 First and foremost, the teenager must survive the 
sexual assault. Then, despite the trauma of the attack, the youth must preserve the necessary 
physical evidence to prove that the incident did, in fact, occur. Finally, the 17-year-old 
must navigate the stigma, fears of retribution, and placement in protective isolation that 
often accompany an accusation of sexual violence. Together, these obstacles lead to the 
underreporting and underestimation of rape and sexual abuse in Texas prisons and jails.  
Second, aggregate statistics about the treatment of 17-year-olds in adult prisons 
may paint a false picture of what occurs within individual facilities. Some correctional 
administrators are more effective than others at balancing facility security needs with the 
humane treatment of incarcerated persons. For example, many reform advocates laud Jail 
Administrator Wayne Dicky for his management of Brazos County’s local jail.141 Dicky 
and his staff use the Inmate Behavior Management (IBM) system developed by the 
National Institute of Corrections to better assess inmate needs, improve behavioral 
outcomes, and optimize operational efficiency.142 The system emphasizes direct 
supervision techniques143 to increase positive staff engagement with incarcerated persons. 
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As a result, Dicky reported that 94 percent of incarcerated individuals at any given time 
did not require disciplinary action in 2015.144 The facility is also PREA compliant and 
reports fewer inmate-on-staff and inmate-on-inmate assaults than facilities of a similar 
size.145 However, even as 17-year-olds in the Brazos County Detention Center benefit from 
the IBM system’s tenets, the teenagers still do not receive the entire breadth of the 
educational services that they require. 
In general, statewide statistics bury the nuance of each individual’s experience of 
confinement across Texas. Brazos County struggles with different problems than other 
Texas jail systems. Therefore, 17-year-olds in one facility are met by different impacts than 
similar teenagers detained elsewhere in the state.  
The third drawback is not a critique of the evidence itself but rather an analysis of 
many readers’ reactions to it. Criminal justice researchers have uncovered brutal conditions 
of confinement that have even led to inmate deaths. Unfortunately, public perceptions of 
those who commit crimes often prevent the success of reform efforts to improve 
correctional living conditions. In line with the “tough on crime” mentality, community 
members may not view the harmful impacts of adult confinement on Texas teens as a 
reason to raise the age of criminal responsibility. Rather, some members of the public 
believe that a prison sentence serves to punish its inhabitants, not as punishment in and of 
itself.146 As a result, the beatings, rape, and psychological trauma that incarcerated people 
experience are viewed as part and parcel of their sentence rather than as a gross violat ion 
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of human rights.147 Thus, merely uncovering the harmful physical, psychologica l, 
developmental, and economic impacts of incarceration may not garner the political will 
that is needed to change the plight of incarcerated 17-year-olds in Texas. 
  
                                                 
147 Ibid. 
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Chapter 4: 
Evidence-Based Benefits of Raising the Age 
The previous chapter explained the harmful impacts of treating 17-year-olds as 
adults when they commit crimes in Texas. Chapter 4 will address a new question: given 
the detriments of the state’s current age policy, what evidence-based benefits could Texans 
achieve by raising the age of criminal responsibility to 18 years old?   
Researchers noted three levels of benefits that accrue to individuals, communit ies, 
and state and county coffers when other states raised their ages of criminal responsibility. 
These benefits (described in greater detail below) include:  
 Micro-level benefits, such as improved neurological and psychosocial 
development for individual youth;  
 Mezzo-level benefits, such as better public safety outcomes for local communit ies; 
and 
 Macro-level benefits, such as net economic benefits for state and county taxpayers. 
MICRO LEVEL: IMPROVED NEUROLOGICAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
Recent developments in neurobiology definitively show researchers what parents 
have known for years – adolescents are different from adults. Advances in functiona l 
imaging technology allow scientists to demonstrate those differences more clearly to the 
public. Researchers have repeatedly found that young people up to age 25 are both 
anatomically and psychologically underdeveloped.148 Despite this evidence, 17-year-old 
Texans do not receive special protections from the state when they break the law. Once 
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they have committed a crime, these teenagers face the adult justice system, even though 
they are still saddled by rudimentary cognitive functioning and immature social skills. 
Brain development research shows that key neurological functions are not yet 
developed by age 17. For example, the average brain’s prefrontal cortex, which controls 
executive functioning, does not fully develop until the age of 25.149 The prefrontal cortex 
is responsible for advanced cognitive processes, such as complex decision-mak ing, 
response inhibition, impulse control, emotional regulation, and the ability to reason. Before 
the prefrontal cortex fully matures, teenagers remain unable to think abstractly about their 
decisions, anticipate consequences, and plan for contingencies. Instead, they must rely on 
gut reactions rather than analytical processes, which hinders their ability to inhib it 
delinquent behaviors.150 The development process can be delayed even further for youth 
who struggle with neurologically-damaging histories of trauma, such as the abuse and 
violence many justice-involved youth encounter as young children.151 
Teenagers’ psychosocial growth occurs alongside their cognitive development. 
Burgeoning neurological functions combine with social inexperience to make 17-year-olds 
inefficient information processors and poor risk assessors.152 As a result, teens often 
emphasize the benefits of an action over its risks and choose consumption over self-
management.153 Teenagers’ hormonal development, social environments, and immature 
                                                 
149 T. Cox, “Brain Maturity Extends Well Beyond Teen Years,” National Public Radio, October 10, 2011, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=141164708.  
150 National Conference of State Legislatures, Adolescent Development & Competency: Juvenile Justice 
Guide Book for Legislators, accessed March 2016, 6, http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jjguidebook-
adolescent.pdf. 
151 Child Welfare Information Gateway, Supporting Brain Development in Traumatized Children and 
Youth (2011): 2, https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/braindevtrauma.pdf.  
152 Ibid, 5.  
153 J.T. Ulmer and D. Steffensmeier, “The Age and Crime Relationship: Social Variation, Social 
Explanations,” in The Nurture Versus Biosocial Debate in Criminology: On the Origins of Criminal 
Behavior and Criminality, ed. by K.M. Beaver, J.C. Barnes, and B.B. Boutwell (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE Publications, 2015), 383. 
 51 
cognitive abilities also predispose them to succumb to peer pressure.154 Unburdened by an 
orientation toward the future, young people are thus more likely to commit crimes with 
like-minded teens than to shirk their peers’ acceptance. 
Neurological and psychosocial findings argue that age impacts behavior, includ ing 
criminal behavior. These findings lead to three significant conclusions regarding the age 
of criminal responsibility in Texas: 
1. Teens are less blameworthy for their criminal behavior. 
2. Teens are more capable of rehabilitation. 
3. Teens will likely age out of delinquency. 
First, research suggests that 17-year-olds are less culpable for their delinquent 
behavior than older adults are. Teens’ vulnerability to peer pressure and lack of decision-
making prowess hinder their ability to understand the consequences of their behaviors and 
restrain themselves from participating in delinquent activities. Thus, their crimina l 
behavior is not the result of “abject moral poverty,” as John DiIulio asserted in the 1990s;155 
rather, their behavior is a side effect of incomplete personality and brain development. 
In at least three recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that age should be a 
mitigating factor in determining criminal culpability and therefore must be taken into 
account when determining a youth’s punishment.156 Further, the MacArthur Research 
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Network demonstrated that teenagers’ developmental immaturity could threaten their 
competency to stand trial. MacArthur researchers found that young people tended to 
misunderstand their Miranda rights, and youth were more susceptible than adult defendants 
to external coercion from authority figures in the justice system.157 
Second, while 17-year-olds are less culpable for their criminal actions, they are also 
more responsive to rehabilitation. At age 17, a teenager’s character has not yet fully 
formed. The juvenile justice system can more positively influence a youth’s character 
development by utilizing therapeutic dispositions. This approach can both hold the 
individual accountable and take full advantage of the teen’s short-lived neurologica l 
malleability to improve their future behavioral outcomes.158 
Finally, teenagers are likely to age out of criminal activity, which tends to peak in 
late adolescence.159 Thus, delinquent behavior at 17 does not necessarily predict future 
criminality. As 17-year-olds transition into adulthood, the juvenile justice system presents 
an opportunity to provide the teenagers with developmentally-appropriate rehabilita t ion 
that can advance healthy adolescent development. However, if teens are placed in the adult 
system, they will experience their formative years of development within prison facilit ies 
dominated by power struggles and violence. Inside adult institutions, a teen’s malleability 
will be used for less productive means, and negative role models may diminish each 
teenager’s potential to age out of a criminal lifestyle.  
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MEZZO LEVEL: BETTER PUBLIC SAFETY OUTCOMES 
Inside adult prisons, teenagers are physically and psychologically harmed by 
cultures of brutality. Such abuse is detrimental to individual teens, but this reality also 
creates more wide-reaching consequences. The impacts of prison violence do not stop at 
each prison’s gate. Instead, these impacts can eventually spread to Texas communities once 
teenagers are released from their cells and taken back to their hometowns. 
For example, widespread sexual abuse in prisons and jails places 17-year-olds at 
greater risk for contracting sexually transmitted diseases. Rates of HIV/AIDS are five times 
higher inside prisons than they are in outside communities, and these rates are even greater 
for incarcerated African Americans.160 Once released, formerly incarcerated individua ls 
bring these diseases (and their associated treatment costs) back to their home 
neighborhoods. 
More prevalent than HIV infections, however, is the risk that high recidivism can 
pose to public safety. When formerly incarcerated teens return home, they carry the 
traumas of adult prisons with them. Instead of being welcomed home with support, they 
are often met by intractable barriers and stigma that make rejoining the community 
challenging. As their reintegration efforts flounder, their recidivism rates grow, and new 
victims are left in their wake. 
Recidivism rates for 17-year-olds vary drastically depending upon the state (and 
thus the prevailing age of criminal responsibility) where teenagers commit their crimes. 
Between 1993 to 1999, the MacArthur Research Network tracked two groups of justice -
involved youth returning to their communities.161 Both groups had similar crimina l 
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histories, economic backgrounds, and other recidivism risk factors. The key difference 
between the teenagers was their community of origin: one group of 17-year-olds lived in 
New Jersey and faced the state’s juvenile justice system, while the other group lived in 
New York and faced the state’s adult justice system. 
MacArthur researchers found a striking difference in re-arrest rates between the 
two groups. Despite social and economic similarities with their New Jersey peers, the New 
York teens were 85 percent more likely to be re-arrested for a violent crime and 44 percent 
more likely to be re-arrested for a property crime upon release.162 The New York teenagers 
also had a 26 percent greater chance of being re-incarcerated than the New Jersey teens, 
starting the cycle of imprisonment, release, and recidivism all over again.163 In contrast, 
teens served in New Jersey’s juvenile courts and those who were diverted from the justice 
system altogether were far less likely to commit new crimes, particularly violent ones.164 
More recent research affirmed the MacArthur Research Network’s original findings. In 
2007, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that youth who 
served time in adult prisons experienced 34 percent more felony re-arrests than similar 
youth who were detained in juvenile facilities.165 
Crime researchers argue that two cultural and structural differences between the 
adult and juvenile justice systems make teens in adult prisons more likely to reoffend than 
their peers in juvenile detention centers.166 First, adult facilities are consumed by cultures 
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that emphasize punishment and violence over rehabilitation and recovery. As described in 
Chapter 3, incarcerated 17-year-olds are at increased risk of physical and sexual assault, 
and they are often denied adequate mental health treatments. The impressionable teenagers 
must then endure within a prison culture where antisocial, violent behavior is modeled and 
even rewarded. Within these so-called “crime schools,” 17-year-olds then learn to reenact 
behaviors that jeopardize public safety.167 
Second, the adult system’s staffing structure is not conducive to a 17-year-old’s 
unique needs. Prison staff members may not receive training on how interactions with 
teenage inmates should differ from interactions with adult inmates. The lack of adequate 
resources and training procedures preclude guards, wardens, and administrators from 
adjusting prison practices to align with the science of adolescent development.168 Higher 
inmate-to-staff ratios and fewer productive and routine activities block teenagers’ ability 
to partake in effective rehabilitative programming that can reduce future criminal activity. 
The key to combating teenage recidivism and re-incarceration is to match the right 
individuals with the right treatment opportunities.169 When the justice system does this 
effectively, the community experiences positive impacts, such as fewer violent crimes, 
reduced future victimization, and improved public safety.170 In Texas, the juvenile system 
offers the tools needed to successfully pair 17-year-olds with the rehabilita t ive 
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opportunities that they require, including drug treatment, educational programming, and 
counseling services. Further, in 2015, the 84th Texas Legislature took steps to keep 
adjudicated children closer to home when they come in contact with the justice system, 
which further reduces recidivism rates.171 If 17-year-olds are treated as juveniles in the 
justice system, these teens will be given the same opportunity to strengthen ties to their 
communities, increase family involvement in their progress, and ease the reentry process 
when their sentences are completed. As a result, current recidivism rates for Texas 17-year-
olds can be slashed, and community safety can improve.  
MACRO LEVEL: NET ECONOMIC BENEFITS 
Chapter 3 described the economic consequences of treating 17-year-olds as adults 
in the criminal justice system. Faced with challenges in obtaining employment, public 
benefits, and social supports, each youth incarcerated in adult facilities is estimated to lose 
about $179,000 in earnings over a lifetime.172 This negative impact, however, could be 
altered by raising the age of criminal responsibility in Texas. Research shows that handling 
17-year-olds within the juvenile justice system will create economic costs, but those costs 
will be far outweighed by economic benefits that accrue to taxpayers, future victims, and 
rehabilitated youth. 
Cost Estimates 
In 2015, the 84th Texas Legislature considered HB 53, HB 330, and HB 1205, all 
of which proposed raising the age of criminal responsibility to 18 years old. However, 
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opponents feared that the upfront costs of such a change would overwhelm state and county 
budgets. The Legislative Budget Board (LBB) estimated that raising the age would cost 
about $76 million in the first biennium after the new law was passed.173 The LBB’s 
estimate used projected sentencing trends and current justice system costs to determine the 
financial impact of each proposed bill. Though the LBB assumed that many 17-year-olds 
would be diverted away from juvenile detention, the overall cost of the change remained 
high because serving youth at any level of the juvenile system is substantially more 
expensive than serving individuals in the adult system. Whether juveniles are detained in 
a facility, released on parole, or sentenced to community supervision, they are entitled to 
costly programming and educational services that adults do not mandatorily receive.174 
Table 3 lists the differences in imprisonment, parole, and probation costs in Texas’ two 
justice systems. 
 
Table 3. Costs Per Day for Texas’ Adult and Juvenile Justice Systems 
 Adult System Juvenile System 
Adult Incarceration or Juvenile Detention $54.89 $437.11 
Parole Supervision $4.04 $31.93 
Community or Probation Supervision $1.63 $5.40 
Source: U. Parks, Fiscal Note, 84th Legislative Regular Session in Re: HB 1205 by Dutton  [Memorandum] 
Austin, TX: Legislative Budget Board, April 1, 2015, 2, 
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/84R/fiscalnotes/pdf/HB01205I.pdf#navpanes=0. 
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In addition to expenses associated with shifting 17-year-olds to more expensive 
juvenile caseloads, costs of raising the age of criminal responsibility in Texas could include 
(but are not limited to):175 
 Greater arrest expenditures, as juvenile arrests can cost about 50 percent176 more 
than adult arrests; 
 Increased juvenile court costs, including hiring, training, and case processing 
expenses; 
 Resources to hire more juvenile probation officers; 
 Training costs for adult probation and parole officers who transfer from the adult 
system to the juvenile system; 
 Capital investments to add beds to state and county juvenile facilities; and 
 Costs to develop and implement new programming and treatment options relevant 
to older juveniles, such as job readiness training and independent living courses. 
Benefit Estimates 
Dialogue about costs, however, fails to recognize the economic benefits that could 
accrue if legislators choose to raise the age of criminal responsibility in Texas. In 2010, the 
Texas Blue Ribbon Task Force on Transforming Juvenile Justice estimated that taxpayers 
could save between $1.7 and $2.3 million for each rehabilitated youth who is turned away 
from a criminal lifestyle.177 As discussed previously, the juvenile justice system is better 
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equipped to change 17-year-olds’ behaviors and lead them down a path toward productive 
community involvement. 
In a 2012 study, public policy researchers Michele Deitch, Rebecca Breeden, and 
Ross Weingarten sought to determine the net financial impact of diverting 17-year-olds to 
the juvenile justice system in Texas. Rather than exclusively calculating costs, the analysts 
also estimated the cost savings and future benefits that Texas taxpayers, avoided victims, 
and rehabilitated youth could experience if legislators raised the age of crimina l 
responsibility. Cost savings and future benefits targeted in the study included:178 
 A decrease in the adult prison, state jail, and community supervision populations; 
 Avoided capital investments in county and state facilities in order to comply with 
PREA’s Youthful Inmate Standard; 
 A reduction in future recidivism costs, including decreases in re-arrests and re-
incarceration expenses; 
 Reduced victimization costs caused by declines in both reported and unreported 
future crimes; and 
 Enhanced earning opportunities for individuals who commit crimes at age 17 and 
have their records sealed. 
Deitch, Breeden, and Weingarten estimated that total taxpayer costs would amount 
to about $159 million if Texas changed its criminal age policy.179 However, taxpayer, 
victim, and youth benefits together amounted to almost $250 million, a figure which still 
does not include several important benefits, such as the savings that could be achieved by 
removing convicted teens from adult parole caseloads, reducing lifetime recidivism rates, 
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and decreasing the teens’ future reliance on social services.180 In total, the analysts 
estimated that raising the age of criminal responsibility in Texas would generate nearly $90 
million in net economic benefits for each cohort of 17-year-olds moved to the juvenile 
justice system.181 If calculated again in 2016, net economic benefits would likely be even 
greater than they were in 2012 due to dropping arrest rates for 17-year-olds across Texas. 
Many researchers have noted the micro-level developmental advantages and 
mezzo-level community safety improvements that a raise the age initiative could cultivate. 
However, most advocates have also acknowledged that such benefits can only be achieved 
at great financial cost to local counties. For example, in 2015, Harris County officia ls 
asserted that raising the age would cost them $50 million in juvenile facility updates in the 
first year of implementation alone.182 Recent research changes the tone and direction of 
this policy conversation. Most costs of raising the age would fall on individual counties, 
but Deitch, Breeden, and Weingarten’s study shows that most benefits would accrue to the 
same county-level stakeholders. For example, raising the age in Dallas County may require 
county commissioners to allocate funds to hire new juvenile probation officers. However, 
Dallas County officials would also avoid spending $4 million per year on housing 
incarcerated 17-year-olds separately from adult inmates.183 By outlining both the policy’s 
costs and benefits, state legislators and county leaders may finally see that raising the age 
is a change that Texas can no longer afford to defer. 
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EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE 
Evidence discussed in Chapter 4 shows that individuals, communities, and state 
institutions could collectively benefit from a raise the age initiative. To evaluate those 
benefits, researchers often rely on cost-benefit analyses that clearly define and monetize 
the impact of a policy change. However, two practical and ethical challenges arise when 
cost-benefit analyses are used to assess the net result of raising the age of crimina l 
responsibility.  
First, practical problems occur when researchers undertake a cost-benefit analysis 
of the raise the age initiative in Texas. Raising the age of criminal responsibility creates 
clear-cut costs, such as the need to hire more juvenile judges, probation officers, and 
service providers who can meet increased demand within the juvenile justice system. Those 
costs are simple to understand, calculate, and publicize. The benefit side of the equation, 
however, is more challenging to translate into a dollar value. Improved brain development 
and reduced lifetime recidivism rates for affected teens have far-reaching impacts that are 
difficult to condense into one benefit calculation. 
Throughout the study, Deitch, Breeden, and Weingarten made extremely 
conservative assumptions that overestimated the policy change’s costs and underestimated 
its benefits.184 This ultimately left readers with an underestimation of net economic benefits 
associated with raising the age of criminal responsibility to 18 in Texas. Behaviora l 
economists, however, have shown that the dollar values placed on costs and benefits may 
not be directly comparable, which hinders analysts’ ability to determine the true net impact 
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of any policy change. People tend to be more psychologically sensitive to losses than to 
gains, even when those changes are of the same magnitude.185 Thus, the benefits of raising 
the age of criminal responsibility may not directly offset costs of the same dollar value, 
despite what proponents of cost-benefit analyses suggest. 
This problem is compounded further by the fact that benefits and costs associated 
with particular stakeholders may carry more weight than their dollar values suggest. For 
example, though Deitch, Breeden, and Weingarten’s analysis includes benefits to 
taxpayers, victims, and rehabilitated 17-year-olds, legislators tend to prioritize only those 
benefits that accrue to taxpayers. As a result, policymakers may not consider the entire 
breadth of benefits that could result from raising the state’s age of criminal responsibility 
to 18 years old. 
Cost-benefit analyses also present inmates’ rights advocates with an ethical 
dilemma. The tool prioritizes the health of state budgets over the well-being of 17-year-old 
Texans. In theory, cost-benefit analyses suggest that policy changes should be pursued 
when their financial benefits outweigh costs.186 To make this determination, considerations 
for both sides of an issue must be defined in a common scale: dollars and cents. Money 
then lies at the center of any policy choice. Physical, psychological, and developmenta l 
outcomes for Texas teenagers are not traded on any economic markets. Their lives do not 
easily translate into a dollar value, and to do so fails to capture their inherent worth as 
human beings. Sound public policies are not simply those that save money; rather, they are 
policies that identify a social problem and tackle it in order to improve the lives of 
vulnerable populations. Though raising the age could generate net economic benefits, the 
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Economic Perspectives 27, no. 1 (2013): 175, http://faculty.som.yale.edu/nicholasbarberis/jep_2013.pdf.  
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use of the cost-benefit tool still creates discomfort among social justice advocates who 
believe policy should be written to empower people, not to engender profits. 
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Chapter 5: 
Recommendations 
Over the last decade, Texas endured a national scandal over its juvenile justice 
system to eventually become a prominent justice reform leader.187 Stakeholders from all 
political ideologies have repeatedly joined together in an effort to decrease incarceration 
rates, maintain community safety, and cut correctional costs. Despite major reform 
successes, however, the state’s pursuit of “smart justice” continues to leave vulnerable 17-
year-olds behind. 
As demonstrated in previous chapters, the current age of criminal responsibility in 
Texas harms 17-year-olds physically, psychologically, developmentally, and 
economically. Treatment as adults in the justice system fails to reform teenagers’ 
delinquent behaviors. Instead, adult sentences lead impressionable 17-year-olds down a 
path toward greater abuse, criminality, or, in cases like Rodney Hulin, Jr., toward death. 
The impacts of the criminal age policy in Texas stretch beyond individual 17-year-olds and 
their families. The policy also hinders public safety outcomes and drains state and county 
coffers. Texas’ aberrant age policy requires revision. This chapter proposes three key 
recommendations for facilitating a smooth and cost-effective policy change. Following 
such a change, 17-year-olds who commit crimes may finally be treated as the kids that 
developmental scientists and parents know them to be. 
The three recommendations described in this chapter are:  
 Raise the age of criminal responsibility from 17 to 18 years old. 
                                                 
187 Editorial Board, “Texas Leads the Way in Needed Criminal Justice Reforms,” The Washington Post, 
January 28, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/texas -leads-the-way-in-needed-criminal-
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 Set a policy transition period and form an implementation task force before the new 
law is enacted. 
 Design a matching grant program through which counties may receive financial aid 
to enforce the state’s reformed age policy. 
(Appendix A includes a suggested timeline for the policy change process.) 
RECOMMENDATION 1: RAISE THE AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
In 2017, the 85th Texas Legislature should raise the age of criminal responsibility 
from 17 to 18 years old. The policy change will not alter the state’s ability to certify 
juveniles as adults when they commit the most dangerous and serious crimes; those 17-
year-olds may still be transferred to the adult system. Instead, the law should simply alter 
the existing status quo. As a result, vulnerable 17-year-olds will be funneled into the 
juvenile justice system by default. Only extreme circumstances may then allow teenagers 
to face adult criminal charges, prison sentences, and collateral consequences. 
Act Now, Not Later 
In 2015, the 84th Texas Legislature debated raising the age of crimina l 
responsibility. The House of Representatives approved the measure, but the Senate 
dissented and instead requested further review of the policy change.188 Legislators during 
the 85th legislative session should not delay Texas’ raise the age reforms any longer. 
                                                 
188 T. Langford, and M. Watkins, “Texas Teens Win One, Lose One,” The Texas Tribune, May 31, 2015, 
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Independent researchers189 and state officials190 have already completed comprehensive 
reviews, causing stakeholders to reach a widespread consensus in favor of a raise the age 
policy change. Legislators should capitalize on converging practical and political realities 
that make 2017 the ideal moment for concrete action. 
Practical Considerations 
Practical considerations regarding juvenile crime rates could allow state and county 
governments to comfortably incorporate 17-year-olds into the existing Texas juvenile 
justice system. Between 2000 and 2014, law enforcement officials reported a 60 percent 
drop in the total number of juveniles arrested and a 45 percent drop in the number of 17-
year-olds arrested across the state.191 When youth arrest rates decline, juvenile courts, 
probation departments, and facilities have greater unused capacity with which to serve 
justice-involved youth. Trends in arrest rates, however, can change. Therefore, legisla tors 
should exploit current declining rates in order to implement a policy change while the 
justice system is capable of absorbing an expanded juvenile population. 
Juvenile justice reforms passed during the 84th legislative session could also 
precipitate a drop in the number of youth detained in state juvenile detention centers over 
the next decade. This reduction in detention rates will further increase the resources 
available to serve 17-year-olds in the juvenile system. In 2015, the Council of State 
                                                 
189 See C. Henrichson and V. Levshin, “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Raising the Age of Juvenile Jurisdiction 
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84th Legislature (January 2015): 3-13, 
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191 Texas Department of Public Safety, Crime in Texas Reports (2000-2014), 
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Governments (CSG) Justice Center released a study demonstrating that Texas teens who 
commit crimes are more likely to avoid re-arrest when they complete their dispositions 
closer to home.192 In response to the study, state legislators passed SB 1630 
(Whitmire/Turner); the juvenile justice reform package required state- and county-leve l 
stakeholders to develop a regionalization plan that will safely and efficiently divert 
juveniles away from state-level detention facilities and into county-level placements. 
Analysts estimate that, as a result of SB 1630, up to 80 percent of the juveniles traditiona lly 
housed in state lockups could instead be kept in their home communities, where each teen’s 
support systems are stronger and where his or her chances of recidivism will decrease.193 
In addition to depopulating state-level juvenile facilities, SB 1630 reforms will 
allow justice leaders to focus limited system resources on hiring more community-based 
juvenile correctional officials.194 As a result, 17-year-olds may now be transferred into the 
existing juvenile system with minimal need for constructing new juvenile detention beds 
and hiring new probation officers. Most importantly, raising the age at the first availab le 
moment will ensure that as many 17-year-olds as possible will reap the rehabilita t ive 
benefits of the Texas Legislature’s efforts to keep justice-involved youth in their home 
communities. 
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Political Considerations 
While bipartisan support wanes for most issues, political momentum soars for cost-
effective, evidence-based criminal justice reforms, including raising the age of crimina l 
responsibility. For many supporters, raising the age is viewed as the “obvious next step” to 
improving Texas criminal justice outcomes.195  
Though legislators did not pass a raise the age bill in 2015, the reform carried 
widespread support from politically diverse stakeholders. During a hearing held by the 
House Juvenile Justice and Family Issues Committee in April 2015,196 every stakeholder 
who testified spoke in support of the principle of raising the age of criminal responsibility; 
each speaker agreed that treating 17-year-olds as adults in the criminal justice system is 
both ineffective and developmentally inappropriate. Stakeholders who testified in 
opposition to the initiative merely wished to expand the timeline that the proposed bills 
suggested for implementing the new policy. Some of the diverse groups that offered public 
support for raising the age in 2015 included: 
 Texas legislators, such as Rep. Gene Wu, Rep. Harold Dutton, Rep. Toni Rose, 
Sen. Juan Hinojosa, and former Rep. Ruth Jones McClendon; 
 Academic researchers, such as criminal justice expert Michele Deitch of the LBJ 
School of Public Affairs and the UT School of Law; 
 Individuals with lived experience in the criminal justice system, such as 
members of Helping Young People Excel (HYPE); 
 Child advocates, such as Texans Care for Children and the Austin Parent Teacher 
Association; 
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 Criminal justice reform advocates , such as the Texas Criminal Justice Coalition, 
the ACLU of Texas, the Texas Public Policy Foundation, Texas Appleseed, and 
Grassroots Leadership; 
 Law enforcement officials, such as the Dallas, Bexar, and Harris County Sheriffs; 
and 
 Justice system officials, such as the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, 
District Judge Jeanne Meurer of Travis County, and District Judge Laura Parker of 
Bexar County. 
The most vocal opponent to the 84th Legislature’s raise the age movement was 
Senator John Whitmire (D-Houston), the chair of the Senate Criminal Justice Committee. 
For over 40 years, Senator Whitmire has served as a state legislator, devoting much of his 
tenure to reforming the state’s adult and juvenile justice systems.197 In 2015, however, 
Senator Whitmire opposed the raise the age initiative. He cited the potential pitfalls of 
implementing SB 1630 reforms that aimed to divert juveniles out of the justice system 
while simultaneously transferring 17-year-olds into that same system.198 
In January 2016, however, Senator Whitmire expressed public support for a raise 
the age bill in Texas.199 In a speech delivered at the University of Houston Law Center’s 
“Police, Jails, and Vulnerable People Symposium,” Senator Whitmire declared that he was 
open to raising the age of criminal responsibility, particularly for 17-year-olds who commit 
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misdemeanors; however, he also expressed his desire to ensure that Texas communit ies 
can accomplish the change without overwhelming juvenile courts, probation departments, 
and facility staff.200 As previously described, this may be achieved by raising the age at a 
time when juvenile arrest and incarceration rates are already in rapid decline. 
Lessons from Other States 
In recent years, other states have undertaken similar raise the age reforms, but each 
state approached the policy change differently. State legislators and reform advocates in 
Texas should learn from the experiences of their counterparts in other states in order to 
maximize the success and impact of the raise the age initiative. 
For example, a new Texas law should avoid the pitfalls of the Illinois policy change 
by raising the age of criminal responsibility for all youth under 18. In Illinois, lawmakers 
initially raised the age only for 17-year-olds who committed misdemeanors, not for those 
who committed felonies.201 This bifurcated approach created so many difficulties that state 
officials quickly passed new legislation to move 17-year-olds charged with felonies to the 
juvenile justice system as well.202 Illinois faced two major problems by raising the age of 
criminal responsibility solely for misdemeanants: 1) the policy created confusion for law 
enforcement officers, and 2) the policy restricted prosecutors’ ability to handle cases 
against 17-year-olds.203 
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First, law enforcement officers who apprehended 17-year-olds were forced to make 
quick decisions about the type of criminal offense that was committed. This choice was 
particularly challenging for crimes that may be classified as either misdemeanors or 
felonies, such as larceny theft for which the value of the stolen property determines the 
level of the offense. Once a decision was made about a crime’s classification, Illino is 
officers and court officials had difficulty changing that classification, even in light of new 
evidence. In particular, stakeholders faced challenges when they attempted to move 17-
year-olds back and forth between the adult and juvenile justice systems.204 If Texas 
lawmakers pursued a similar bifurcated raise the age policy, law enforcement officers 
would experience the same obstacles. The problem could even be amplified in Texas where 
about 35 percent of the crimes for which 17-year-olds were arrested in 2014 involved 
larceny theft and drug possession charges that initially may be judged as either 
misdemeanors or felonies.205  
Second, a bifurcated approach to raising the age can create problems for 
prosecutors. Prosecutors depend upon their ability to alter charges throughout the justice 
process in order to make use of new evidence and negotiate plea deals. However, Illino is 
prosecutors found that this ability was stunted when the state raised the age of crimina l 
responsibility only for 17-year-olds who committed misdemeanors.206 Altering charges 
became impossible when such actions shifted the jurisdiction of a 17-year-old’s case 
entirely from the adult system to the juvenile system. Thus, a raise the age law in Texas 
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should circumvent the prosecutorial challenges experienced in Illinois by raising the age 
of criminal responsibility for all justice-involved 17-year-olds, not misdemeanants only. 
Finally, Texas lawmakers should explicitly address retroactivity to avoid the 
confusion that Massachusetts officials faced in 2013. The Massachusetts raise the age law 
failed to address retroactivity. As a result, individuals who were 17 at the time of their 
offense but who committed that crime before the policy change took effect sued the state 
and requested transfer to the juvenile system.207 Texas legislators should bypass similar 
confusion and court costs by explicitly stating that the raised age of criminal responsibility 
is not retroactive. 
RECOMMENDATION 2: SET A TRANSITION PERIOD AND FORM A TASK FORCE 
The timeline for raising the age of criminal responsibility in Texas is critical. 
Seventeen-year-olds will trickle into the juvenile justice system slowly, especially if 
legislators do not make the law retroactive. Still, a policy change of this size and 
significance requires careful planning before the law takes effect. Therefore, Texas should 
delay the raise the age measure’s effective date to ensure that stakeholders have adequate 
time to prepare for the introduction of 17-year-olds into the juvenile justice system. While 
the law should be passed in 2017, it should not take effect until September 2018. (See 
Appendix A for a detailed policy change timeline.) 
A transition period from July 2017 to September 2018 is essential for two reasons. 
First, this time period allows Texas counties to independently make accommodations for 
the 17-year-olds who will be sent to the juvenile justice system in 2018.208 Local probation 
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departments may use this time to lobby for greater funding from their county 
commissioners, update their facilities, train new juvenile probation officers, and develop 
new programs that can address the specific needs of older teenagers. 
Second, and most importantly, the transition period will enable state and county 
leaders to work collaboratively as they anticipate the challenges that the new policy may 
create.209 Legislators should increase productivity during the transition period by creating 
a formal task force comprised of diverse state and county stakeholders. After a raise the 
age bill is passed, the governor should appoint task force members who represent all 
relevant interest groups, including individuals from rural, urban, and suburban counties. At 
a minimum, the governor should request participation from the following stakeholders: 
 State agencies, such as the TJJD, TDCJ, and the Texas Correctional Office on 
Offenders with Medical or Mental Impairments (TCOOMMI);210 
 Juvenile-specific county agencies, such as local juvenile probation departments; 
 Law enforcement agencies, such as the Sheriffs’ Association of Texas; 
 Juvenile court officials, such as local judges, public defenders, and district 
attorneys; 
 Child welfare advocates, such as Texans Care for Children; 
 Criminal justice reform organizations, such as the Texas Criminal Justice 
Coalition and the Texas Public Policy Foundation; and 
 Individuals with lived experience as youth in the adult justice system, such as 
the founders of Helping Young People Excel (HYPE). 
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TJJD (the agency most impacted by the policy change) should appoint a 
representative to serve as the task force’s chairperson. It is crucial, however, that 
individuals with lived experience as 17-year-olds in adult prisons have a voice within the 
workgroup. These individuals bring a unique closeness to the problem and thus can provide 
essential input into developing viable solutions. 
Between July 2017 and September 2018, the task force should meet at least once 
per month. As a group, members should analyze potential implementation problems that 
could arise in Texas communities when the raise the age policy takes effect in 2018. 
Members should also develop solutions to these problems by empowering local 
communities to voice their concerns and by communicating with leaders who have 
instituted similar reforms in other states. Finally, the workgroup should develop 
mechanisms through which county stakeholders can communicate any unforeseen issues 
that may arise once the policy takes effect. 
After the new policy becomes effective, the task force should continue meeting in 
order to provide technical assistance to individual counties. If able, task force members 
may collaborate to resolve issues brought forth by county leaders who are implementing 
the new state policy. If local challenges must be addressed by statute, the task force should 
also create a set of formal recommendations on adjusting the raise the age legislation during 
the 86th legislative session. Then, in early 2019, state lawmakers and county leaders may 
swiftly pass and implement any final changes that must be made to policies dictating the 
age of criminal responsibility. 
RECOMMENDATION 3: DESIGN A MATCHING GRANT PROGRAM 
After the implementation task force is formed, state leaders must also take steps to 
ensure that the raise the age initiative is adequately funded. Without sufficient support, 
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TJJD and local juvenile probation departments will not be able to provide 17-year-olds 
with the rehabilitation that the teenagers require. Therefore, when crafting a bill that raises 
the age of criminal responsibility, state legislators should design a matching grant program. 
Using this funding mechanism, county leaders may obtain the financial aid that they need 
to implement the policy change efficiently and effectively. 
The matching grant program can be administered through TJJD’s budget 
appropriation. Legislators should increase the state agency’s funding through a budget rider 
during the next biennium to cover costs projected by the LBB. TJJD may then allocate a 
portion of this additional funding to policy impacts experienced at the county level. Before 
the raise the age law takes effect in 2018, local juvenile probation boards located in each 
county may apply for state funding through TJJD’s grant program. In order to disperse 
funding fairly, the Texas Legislature should appoint an independent budget specialist who 
can develop the grant’s formal criteria and allocation formula. 
The matching grant program should be divided into two tiers of aid.211 The state 
may allocate the first tier of funding to top priority tasks that counties must complete before 
the state raises its age of criminal responsibility in September 2018. These tasks may 
include adding bed capacity to existing juvenile facilities, expanding the juvenile probation 
workforce, and providing immediate technical assistance to counties that face 
unanticipated obstacles. The state may allocate the second tier of funding to long- term 
projects that directly impact 17-year-olds’ unique rehabilitative needs. For example, these 
funds may be granted to juvenile probation departments that wish to develop new programs 
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specifically designed for older teenagers, such as job readiness training or independent 
living courses. 
Together, the two tiers of funding will provide structure and consistency to the grant 
process. Most importantly, the tiers will create flexibility during the implementation phase 
of the policy change. Before passing a raise the age bill, Texas leaders cannot predict 
exactly where funding will be needed most. A flexible grant program can help to ensure 
that dollars flow to the correct stakeholders as the implementation process unfolds.212 
Establishing a funding mechanism for a statewide raise the age initiative is essential 
to garnering public support for the law and addressing the potential costs of the policy 
change. (See Appendix B for information about how these costs can be estimated before 
the policy change goes into effect.) However, it is important to note that other states did 
not experience high costs when altering their own age policies. Between 2010 and 2012, 
state legislators in Connecticut budgeted almost $40 million to raise the state’s age of 
criminal responsibility from 16 to 18; by the end of the 2012 budget cycle, local counties 
left nearly one-third of those funds unspent.213 Similarly, in Illinois, legislators set aside 
state funds for counties to use after a raise the age bill was passed; no counties requested 
financial support, allowing Illinois to make the change without an infusion of any new state 
funds.214 In both Connecticut and Illinois, decreasing juvenile crime rates (similar to those 
seen in Texas) outpaced the influx of 17-year-olds into the juvenile justice system. As a 
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result, cost projections made during the legislative process were overestimated, and the 
states experienced greater net benefits than originally predicted.215 
EVALUATION PLAN 
During the 2015 legislative session, reform advocates projected substantial positive 
impacts that could result from raising the age of criminal responsibility in Texas. These 
impacts included lower recidivism rates, reduced victimization, and improved economic 
outcomes for justice-involved 17-year-olds. After a raise the age bill is passed, Texas 
leaders should formally assess and quantify the effects of serving 17-year-olds in the 
juvenile justice system. Then, lawmakers may determine what changes can be made to 
further improve outcomes for justice-involved 17-year-olds across the state. 
In 2023 during the 88th legislative session, TJJD should release a request for 
proposals to identify an outside agency that is capable of evaluating the 2018 raise the age 
policy change. To ensure the independence of the evaluating agency, members of the 
implementation task force must be barred from performing the follow-up evaluation. 
Potential evaluators include the University of Texas Center for Social Work Research, the 
Center for Health and Social Policy (CHASP) at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, and the 
Texas A&M Public Policy Research Institute. During the 88th legislative session, 
lawmakers should pass a budget rider to ensure that the policy evaluation is adequately 
funded. Initial results from the evaluation should be made available to legislators during 
the 89th legislative session in 2025. 
During the 2023-2024 biennium, the evaluating agency should measure three levels 
of impact. First, the agency should assess macro-level policy impacts. For example, 
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evaluators should estimate the actual costs of implementing the raise the age initiative by 
conducting a county-by-county survey. Then, evaluators should analyze population trends 
within juvenile facilities following the implementation of the new policy. The introduction 
of 17-year-olds into juvenile facilities should not reverse the downward trend in 
incarceration rates for all Texas youth because: 1) 17-year-olds should make up only a 
small portion of total juvenile arrests, and 2) the teens largely commit low-level crimes that 
do not require incarceration in secure facilities. If evaluators find that juvenile incarceration 
rates have increased, legislators may wish to assess disparities in sentencing practices 
between 17-year-olds and other justice-involved youth. The 89th Texas Legislature should 
then statutorily address these disparities. 
Second, evaluators should examine mezzo-level policy impacts in Texas 
communities. Two key measures can illustrate how public safety changed following the 
raise the age initiative: 1) trends in youth arrest rates and 2) trends in youth recidivism 
rates. After controlling for other relevant factors, analysts may determine if the policy 
change altered initial arrest rates and subsequent recidivism rates for 17-year-olds. A 
decrease in both measures could show that treating 17-year-olds within the juvenile justice 
system more effectively addresses the underlying causes of criminal activity. In contrast, 
an increase in these measures could reveal that the policy change encouraged crimina l 
activity; without the threat of the adult criminal justice system, 17-year-olds may engage 
in more delinquent behaviors and ultimately jeopardize community safety further. Other 
states, however, have not reported an increase in arrest or re-offense rates as a result of 
raising the age of criminal responsibility. 
Third, evaluators must examine the micro-level policy impacts of the raise the age 
legislation. Most importantly, analysts should study mental health outcomes among 17-
year-olds sent to the juvenile justice system. Quality of life assessments and psychologica l 
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evaluations may be conducted as juveniles enter the justice system and immediately before  
they are released from confinement and/or community supervision. Similar assessments 
should also be conducted for 17-year-olds certified to the adult criminal justice system. 
After controlling for other factors, evaluators may then draw comparisons between the two 
groups to illustrate the different mental health outcomes experienced by individuals who 
are served in the juvenile and adult justice systems. A longer-term evaluation may study 
other micro-level impacts, such as economic and health outcomes among formerly 
incarcerated individuals and their families.  
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Chapter 6: 
Conclusion 
Over the past decade, Texas legislators revolutionized the state’s approach to 
juvenile justice issues. As the nation’s leader in reform, Texas revamped sentencing 
structures, emphasized innovative diversion strategies, and depopulated state-run juvenile 
detention facilities. Still, the state continues to leave 17-year-olds behind in its quest to 
improve juvenile justice outcomes. The age of criminal responsibility in Texas represents 
an ineffective public policy in need of critical reform. The law, which dates back to 1918, 
mirrors a tough-on-crime mentality that state leaders have worked hard to alter since the 
early 2000s. The automatic placement of 17-year-olds in the adult justice system ignores 
brain science and funnels hard-earned tax dollars toward greater criminality, not future 
productivity. Most importantly, Texas’ age of criminal responsibility directly harms the 
lives and livelihoods of a vulnerable teenage population. 
In this professional report, I described the devastating impacts that occur when 
lawmakers allow 17-year-olds to serve time in adult prisons. These impacts include high 
rates of physical and sexual victimization, psychological trauma, developmental delays, 
and economic losses that inflict harm years after a person’s confinement ends. Across the 
country, highly-publicized deaths of imprisoned 17-year-olds demonstrate the irreparable 
damage to underdeveloped youth that adult prisons can cause. The stories of Rodney Hulin, 
Jr. and Kalief Browder, however, are not unique. Instead, they are simply the most well-
known tragedies that stand out among an anonymous crowd of abused and isolated 
teenagers.  
Fortunately, there is a better way forward. In the last several years, diverse states, 
such as Mississippi and Connecticut, raised their ages of criminal responsibility to keep 
 81 
17-year-olds out of the adult justice system. As a result, they have documented three key 
benefits: 
1. By harnessing the science of brain development, states provided individual 17-
year-olds with rehabilitative supports that can improve each teenager’s 
neurological and psychosocial development. 
2. Once the teens reentered their communities, they were better equipped to become 
productive members of society. This bolstered community safety for years after 
each individual’s release. 
3. Finally, the policy change reduced recidivism, decreased victimization, and 
lowered the potential for PREA-related funding losses. Together, these outcomes 
preserved limited financial resources for state and local governments. 
Other states have laid a path toward reform. If Texas lawmakers follow this 
example, young people, like those described in this report, would face drastically different 
life outcomes. For example, a young teen like Rodney Hulin, Jr. would not have to fight 
his way to solitary confinement in order to protect himself against sexual assault. Instead, 
he would enroll in TJJD’s evidence-based programs and avoid the traumas of abuse and 
isolation. 
A thin, frightened boy like T.J. Parsell would not hear a prison psychologist make 
sarcastic remarks about rape mere hours before he filed into an adult correctional facility. 
Instead, he would engage with a youth-focused mental health professional who would 
encourage the teen to uncover his potential, not find protection from an older man. 
A bright teen like Glenn Martin would not have to choose between acting as 
predator or prey. Instead, he could choose among classes, programs, and support systems 
designed to broaden his mind and strengthen his skillset. 
 82 
Finally, an introspective teenager like Kalief Browder would not live in solitary 
confinement for two years of his life, shrouded in paranoia and depression until he could 
not take it any longer. Instead, he would be alive today, finishing school with his classmates 
and spending holidays at home surrounded by his family. 
Texas lawmakers have a duty to construct public policies that protect the most 
vulnerable among us, including those who are locked away in the “shadow worlds” of our 
state prisons.216 The year 2017 is not a time for further study; it is a time for action. 
Seventeen-year-olds are not adults, and our state criminal justice policies must reflect that 
reality. During the 85th legislative session, policy leaders should continue our state’s 
progress toward criminal justice reform by raising the age of criminal responsibility across 
Texas. As a result, we may finally treat 17-year-olds as what they truly are – kids who are 
deserving of protection, support, and a real chance at a productive and fulfilling life. 
  
                                                 
216 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting), 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/482/342/case.html.  
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Appendix A: 
Proposed Timeline for the Raise the Age Initiative 
Table 4. Proposed Timeline for the Raise the Age Initiative 
Time Period Task 
May 2016 – January 2017 
Interim Legislative Session 
 Juvenile probation chiefs, adult probation and 
parole officials, TJJD leaders, and TDCJ leaders 
will begin collecting and organizing data to 
estimate the costs of raising the age of criminal 
responsibility. 
 The LBB will begin collaborating with the Texas 
Association of Counties, Texas Municipal 
League, and Texas Probation Association to 
create a survey estimating the costs associated 
with the policy change. 
 Advocates will develop a coalition in favor of 
raising the age of criminal responsibility 
consisting of justice policy experts and 
individuals with lived experience in the adult 
and juvenile justice systems. 
 Advocates will strategize with lawmakers who 
are willing to file a raise the age bill and carry it 
through the 85th legislative session. 
January 2017 – June 2017 
85th Legislative Session 
 Advocates will coordinate stakeholders to testify 
in favor of the raise the age bill. 
 The LBB will develop a fiscal note for the raise 
the age bill using data provided by the cost 
survey outlined in Appendix B. 
 Texas legislators will pass the bill. 
 The governor will sign the bill into law. 
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Table 4. Continued 
June 2017 – July 2017 
Summer Post-Legislative Session 
 The governor will appoint stakeholders to the 
implementation task force. 
July 2017 – September 2018 
Transition Period 
 Task force members will meet monthly to 
analyze potential implementation challenges. 
 Task force members will develop mechanisms 
through which county stakeholders can 
communicate efficiently with the task force after 
the policy change takes effect. 
 A budget specialist will design a matching grant 
program to fund the policy change. 
 County juvenile boards will begin to apply for 
and receive state funding, as well as lobby for 
county funding, plan new programs, and hire 
new staff. 
September 2018 – January 2019 
Initial Implementation Period 
 The policy change will take effect. 
 Task force members will continue meeting to 
discuss implementation outcomes and 
challenges. 
 Task force members will provide technical 
assistance to local juvenile probation 
departments and TJJD. 
 County- and state-level juvenile justice officials 
will track the impact of the policy change on 
their juvenile justice population size and 
programming capacity. 
 Task force members will create and deliver a set 
of recommendations for the 86th Texas 
Legislature on any necessary adjustments that 
must be made to existing statute regarding the 
age of criminal responsibility. 
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Table 4. Continued 
January 2019 – June 2019 
86th Legislative Session 
 TJJD, TDCJ, and county stakeholders will testify 
before the Texas Legislature on the initial 
impacts of the policy change. 
 Legislators will make any necessary adjustments 
to statute based on the task force’s findings and 
recommendations. 
June 2019 – January 2023 
Interim Sessions and 87th 
Legislative Session 
 Legislators will continue to implement necessary 
statutory reforms in order to address unforeseen 
challenges related to the raise the age initiative. 
January 2023 – June 2023 
88th Legislative Session 
 Legislators will release a request for proposals 
(RFP) to appoint an agency capable of 
evaluating the impacts of the raise the age 
policy change. 
 Legislators will pass a budget rider to fund the 
evaluation plan. 
 The evaluating agency will be chosen. 
June 2023 – January 2025 
Evaluation Period 
 The evaluating agency will examine three levels 
of policy impacts: 1) macro-level impacts, such 
as economic costs and population trends; 2) 
mezzo-level impacts, such as youth arrest and 
recidivism rates; and 3) micro-level impacts, 
such as mental health outcomes. 
 The evaluating agency will write and publish a 
report of its initial findings.  
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Appendix B: 
Estimating the Costs of Raising the Age of Criminal Responsibility in 
Texas 
In order to raise the age of criminal responsibility in Texas, legislators, justice 
officials, and reform advocates must fully understand the cost implications of the policy 
change. Costs associated with raising the age were a fundamental concern among Texas 
stakeholders during the 84th legislative session, just as they were when other states 
proposed similar reforms over the past several years. By systematically estimating costs 
associated with this policy change, advocates may supplant worried anecdotes with actual 
data. Lawmakers and reformers may then use these estimates to pass formal statutory 
changes to Texas’ age of criminal responsibility. Most importantly, the estimates may be 
used to inform the appropriation process and the distribution of funds among cities and 
counties that are most impacted by the policy change. Still, it is essential to note that costs 
experienced in other states after legislators raised the age of criminal responsibility were 
significantly less than those initially projected by county and state agencies.217 
POTENTIAL COSTS OF RAISING THE AGE 
Table 5 below outlines the potential costs that may arise by raising Texas’ age of 
criminal responsibility in 2017. The costs are broken down into four categories: 
1. Law enforcement costs; 
2. Court system costs; 
3. State-level costs to TJJD; and 
4. County-level costs to local juvenile probation departments. 
                                                 
217 Texas House of Representatives, House Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence, Interim Report to the 
84th Legislature (January 2015): 9, 
http://www.house.state.tx.us/_media/pdf/committees/reports/83interim/House-Committee-on-Criminal-
Jurisprudence-interim-report.pdf. 
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Table 5. Potential Costs of Raising the Age of Criminal Responsibility 
Category Cost Examples 
Law enforcement costs  Increased arrest expenditures 
Court system costs 
 Increased expenditures to try 17-year-olds as juveniles, 
not adults 
 Hiring costs to add more judges, attorneys, and other 
officials to the juvenile court system in order to 
accommodate the increased volume of juvenile court 
cases 
 Training expenditures for juvenile court judges, 
attorneys, and other court officials to serve older teens 
State-level costs to TJJD 
 Hiring costs to increase the capacity of diversion 
services 
 Increased expenditures to commit 17-year-olds to state 
secure facilities and halfway houses 
 Hiring costs to provide older teens with age-appropriate 
intake/orientation services, educational/vocational 
programming, treatment services, and reentry assistance 
while they are detained in state secure facilities and 
halfway houses 
 Potential capital investments to increase the number of 
beds available in state secure facilities and halfway 
houses 
County-level costs to 
local juvenile probation 
departments 
 Hiring costs to increase the capacity of diversion 
services 
 Increased expenditures to detain 17-year-olds in county-
level pre-adjudication facilities 
 Increased expenditures to detain 17-year-olds in county-
level post-adjudication facilities 
 Potential capital investments to increase the number of 
beds available in county-level pre- and post-adjudication 
facilities 
 Hiring costs to provide older teens with age-appropriate 
intake/orientation services, educational/vocational 
programming, treatment services, and reentry assistance 
while they are detained in pre- and post-adjudication 
facilities 
 Hiring costs to accommodate the increased volume of 
juvenile probation caseloads 
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As previous analyses demonstrate, the costs listed in Table 5 will be offset by 
savings and benefits that accrue to taxpayers, avoided victims, and rehabilitated 
teenagers.218 However, those savings and benefits are more challenging to estimate than 
are most costs. For example, decreases in lifetime recidivism rates and reduced reliance on 
social services occur many years after a teen’s sentence is finished, which hinders 
researchers’ ability to monitor and measure these key outcomes. Further, legislators largely 
focus upon taxpayer costs that result from a policy change, rather than the long- term 
benefits that may accrue to formerly incarcerated persons and their families. As a result, 
reform advocates must be prepared with data demonstrating the direct costs of raising the 
age in order to determine what appropriations will be necessary to implement the policy 
change effectively and efficiently.  
ESTIMATING THE COSTS OF RAISING THE AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY  
To develop a cost estimate, researchers may undergo a five-step process: 
1. Assemble a team of knowledgeable stakeholders to collaborate in the cost analysis.  
2. Conduct preliminary interviews that will inform the focus and direction of the cost 
analysis. 
3. Use information from the initial interviews to design a cost survey for adult and 
juvenile justice officials. 
4. Distribute the survey to a sample of adult and juvenile justice officials across Texas.  
5. Interpret the survey data and release the cost estimates to the Texas Legislature and 
the general public. 
                                                 
218 M. Deitch, R. Breeden, and R. Weingarten, “Seventeen, Going on Eighteen: An Operational and Fiscal 
Analysis of a Proposal to Raise the Age of Juvenile Jurisdiction in Texas,” American Journal of Criminal 
Law 40, no. 1 (2012): 47-56, http://ajclonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/40-1-Deitch.pdf. 
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Step 1: Assemble a Team of Knowledgeable Stakeholders 
To begin the cost analysis, reform advocates should bring together a group of 
knowledgeable stakeholders who can collaborate to reach an accurate cost estimate. Team 
membership could include: 
1. Legislative Budget Board analysts , particularly those on the Criminal Justice 
Data Analysis Team who have ample experience in developing fiscal notes 
regarding changes to justice system policies;219 
2. Independent researchers who have studied raise the age outcomes in other states; 
3. Representatives from Texas advocacy groups , particularly policy analysts from 
Texans Care for Children who organized a convening in September 2014 to discuss 
raising the age of criminal responsibility during the 84th legislative session;220 and 
4. Former employees of the juvenile justice system, such as former county juvenile 
probation chiefs, district judges, and/or juvenile facility line staff who possess a 
deeper understanding of how this policy change will impact the daily operations of 
juvenile court dockets, detention facilities, halfway houses, and probation 
departments. 
Step 2: Conduct Preliminary Interviews 
After the research team is assembled, members should conduct interviews with 
relevant agency leaders. Information gathered from these interviews may then influence 
the focus and direction of the cost survey that will be distributed to adult and juvenile 
justice officials across Texas. Interviewees can be divided into four main categories: 
                                                 
219 See U. Parks, Fiscal Note, 84th Legislative Regular Session in Re: HB 1205 by Dutton  [Memorandum] 
Austin, TX: Legislative Budget Board, April 1, 2015, 1-3, 
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/84R/fiscalnotes/pdf/HB01205I.pdf#navpanes=0. 
220 For more on this convening, see Texans Care for Children, Preparing to Raise the Age: A Stakeholder 
Convening to Help Texas Get it Right  (January 2015): 1-16, 
http://txchildren.org/Images/Interior/raisetheagereportjanuary2015.pdf. 
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1. Adult criminal justice leaders; 
2. Juvenile justice leaders; 
3. Law enforcement officials; and  
4. Leaders who helped bring about similar policy changes in other states. 
Adult Criminal Justice Leaders 
The research team should conduct tours and interviews within a subset of urban, 
rural, and suburban prisons and jails in order to gather the following information: 
 The current capacity of diverse prison and jail facilities that house adult inmates; 
 The number of 17-year-olds who are typically served within these facilities each 
year; 
 Overall trends that facility administrators have noticed among incarcerated 17-
year-olds (e.g., population size, educational needs, and treatment needs); 
 The services that are currently available to 17-year-olds, as well as gaps and 
challenges within in this service delivery system; 
 The mechanisms that staff members use to separate 17-year-olds from older 
inmates in order to comply with PREA’s Youthful Inmate Standard; 
 The challenges that facility administrators face as a result of PREA’s Youthful 
Inmate Standard; and 
 Potential costs that facility administrators (particularly those within local jails) may 
incur to retrofit their facilities in order to attain and/or maintain PREA complia nce. 
Furthermore, the research team should contact adult probation and parole officia ls 
to determine how many individuals who were 17 at the time of their offense are served 
annually by their departments. These officials may also provide information on the unique 
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treatments, programming, and social supports that younger individuals require as they 
complete their probation or parole sentence. 
Juvenile Justice Leaders 
Research team members should also conduct interviews and tours within juvenile 
justice settings. For example, in state- and county-operated detention facilities, the team 
should gather the following information: 
 The current bed capacity and staffing levels within diverse urban, rural, and 
suburban facilities; 
 The current programming opportunities available to detained youth, particula r ly 
programs that cater to older teens, such as independent living courses; 
 The mechanisms that staff members use to separate the youngest juveniles from the 
oldest juveniles within each facility; 
 The current probation caseloads for staff members who provide supervis ion 
services in the community; and 
 The initial impacts of juvenile justice reforms passed during the 84 th legisla t ive 
session, particularly SB 1630 reforms that aimed to keep justice-involved juveniles 
out of state-run facilities and closer to their home communities. 
The research team should also contact juvenile court officials, including district 
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys who serve juveniles across the state. These 
justice officials can educate the research team on the typical size of their caseloads and the 
likely impact that a raise the age initiative will have on county juvenile court systems. 
Law Enforcement Officials 
Team members should also interact with law enforcement officials who have 
experience within both the adult and juvenile justice systems. The research group may 
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interview city and county police officers to determine how their encounters with 17-year-
olds differ from those with younger teenagers who commit similar offenses. The team 
should gather information on how these encounters differ in terms of procedures, costs, 
diversion opportunities, and typical outcomes. 
Leaders from Other States 
Finally, the research team should contact leaders who were instrumental in 
implementing raise the age initiatives in other states. In particular, the group should 
interview leaders from Illinois who attended the raise the age convening hosted by Texans 
Care for Children in September 2014. These leaders represented diverse agencies, such as 
the Cook County Juvenile Probation Department221 and Northwestern University’s 
Children and Family Justice Center.222 Officials from the same or similar agencies could 
provide an update on the costs that Illinois experienced when legislators raised the age of 
criminal responsibility first for 17-year-old misdemeanants and then for 17-year-old felons. 
Step 3: Design a Cost Survey 
After the research group conducts facility tours and stakeholder interviews, team 
members should use that information to design a cost survey for adult and juvenile justice 
officials. With this survey, the team may formally request cost estimates from stakeholders 
representing agencies that will be impacted most by the proposed policy change. Sample 
questions are listed below in Table 6.   
                                                 
221 M. Spooner, Texas Raise the Age (September 2014): 1-19, 
http://txchildren.org/Images/Interior/rta/spooner.pdf.  
222 S. Kollmann, Raising the Age of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: The Future of 17-Year-Olds in Illinois’ 
Justice System (September 2014): 1-43, http://txchildren.org/Images/Interior/rta/kollmann.pdf.  
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Table 6. Cost Survey Sample Questions 
Question Type Sample Questions 
Adult justice 
system questions 
 How many 17-year-olds do you currently serve in your 
facility? 
 What percentage of the inmates who are currently within your 
custody are 17 or were 17 at the time of their offense? 
 Does your facility separate 17-year-olds from older inmates by 
sight and sound to comply with PREA’s Youthful Inmate 
Standard? 
 If your facility does separate 17-year-olds from older inmates, 
how do you accomplish this separation? 
 If your facility does separate 17-year-olds from older inmates, 
what challenges and costs does this task create? 
 If your facility does not separate 17-year-olds from older 
inmates, what changes would facility administrators need to 
make in order to comply with PREA’s Youthful Inmate 
Standard (e.g., increased staffing levels, architectural updates, 
etc.)? 
 If legislators raised Texas’ age of criminal responsibility, what 
costs and/or benefits would your facility experience?  
Juvenile justice 
system questions 
 How many individuals aged 17 and older do you currently 
serve within your agency? 
 What mechanisms do you use to separate older teens from 
younger teens who are served within your agency? 
 If legislators raised Texas’ age of criminal responsibility, 
would your agency require greater resources to accommodate 
this change? 
 Would your agency require increases in staffing levels to 
accommodate this policy change? If so, what type of staff and 
how many additional employees would your agency require? 
 Would your agency require increases in bed capacity to 
accommodate this change? If so, what type of beds and how 
many additional beds would your agency require? 
 Would your agency need technical assistance from the state to 
serve 17-year-olds within your county probation department? If 
so, what type of technical assistance would you require? 
 What one-time costs do you anticipate to incur if legislators 
raise Texas’ the age of criminal responsibility? 
 What recurring costs do you anticipate to incur if legislators 
raise Texas’ age of criminal responsibility? 
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The research team may also choose to design separate survey instruments for other 
stakeholders who anticipate significant costs associated with this policy change, such as 
juvenile court officials. 
Before distributing the survey, the research team should take two intermed iate 
steps. First, team members should collaborate with the Texas Association of Counties, 
Texas Municipal League, and the Texas Probation Association in order to review and 
improve the survey’s language. These agencies may also assist the research team in 
identifying a sample of diverse city, county, and state officials who may participate in the 
survey. 
Second, the team should hold a series of focus groups with representatives from 
TJJD, TDCJ, county juvenile probation departments, and adult probation and parole 
departments. The focus groups will provide valuable feedback that will enable team 
members to polish the survey instrument before it is distributed across the state. 
Step 4: Distribute the Survey. 
Next, the research team should distribute the cost-estimating survey to a sample of 
adult and juvenile justice officials across Texas. Entities such as the Texas Association of 
Counties, Texas Municipal League, and Texas Probation Association may provide 
assistance in building this sample of participants and increasing response rates. Survey 
participants may include (but are not be limited to): 
 TDCJ administrators who manage facilities that currently house 17-year-olds, such 
officials at the Clemens Unit in Brazoria County, Texas; 
 Adult probation and parole chiefs whose departments currently serve individua ls 
who were 17 at the time of their offense; 
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 TJJD administrators who manage the agency’s five state-operated juvenile 
detention facilities; 
 TJJD administrators who manage the state’s eight halfway houses, which serve 
youth with mental illness and substance use issues before they are formally released 
into the community; 
 County juvenile probation officials who manage pre- or post-adjudication facilit ies 
for justice-involved youth; and 
 County juvenile probation officials who administer community supervision for 
justice-involved youth. 
Again, team members may also choose to design separate survey instruments for 
other justice stakeholders (such as law enforcement officers and juvenile court officials) if 
these officials predict that raising the age of criminal responsibility will create significant 
costs within their agencies. Surveys for these individuals could emphasize differential costs 
associated with juvenile and adult arrests and current juvenile court capacities. 
Step 5: Interpret and Release Survey Results 
Finally, the research team should interpret the survey data and formally release cost 
estimates to legislators and the general public. Before disseminating survey results, 
however, the team should pinpoint any outliers within the survey data and follow-up with 
those respondents. For example, if one county juvenile probation chief predicts that raising 
the age of criminal responsibility will cost much more for his or her county than other 
chiefs predicted for similar counties, the research team should inquire about this estimate 
and determine its accuracy. This check on participants’ responses could combat any 
individual’s incentive to overestimate the costs associated with raising the age of crimina l 
responsibility and ultimately lead to a more accurate final estimate. 
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Once survey results are released, legislators, justice leaders, advocates, and budget 
experts may use the data to influence bill proposals, appropriations requests, fiscal notes, 
and criminal justice policy impact statements. As a result, the raise the age initiative will 
be informed by concrete data rather than by unsubstantiated rhetoric. 
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